097.3
Z1092
*1661
9/12/44

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Research and Analysis Branch

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REFERENCE DIVISION
FILE COPY
PLEASE RETURN
REF

R & A No. 1661

Of interest only in a very speculative way since events in last year have clarified situation which has developed with little connection to background of previous Communist activities. Useful for historical background but a bit too long for operational use.

THE ROLE OF COMMUNISM IN THE BALKANS

Description

An investigation of the part played in each of the Balkan countries by the local Communist party from its foundation to the present, with an introduction suggesting the present attitude of the USSR.

12 September 1944

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, 50 USC 31 and 32, as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

Copy No. 52

SECRET

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Introduction.................................... iii

I. Bulgaria..................................... 1

- A. Introductory Summary: the Development of the Party..................................... 1
- B. The Formative Period: the Tesni Socialists.... 3
- C. The Period of Revolutionary Activity.......... 6
- D. Communism on the Defensive, 1925-1935......... 15
- E. Bulgarian Communism and the Popular Front, 1935-1941..................................... 24
- F. The Communists in the Bulgarian Underground, 1941-1944..................................... 29

Appendix: Bulgarians in International Communist Councils..................................... 35

II. Yugoslavia.................................. 36

- A. Introduction: the Problem..................... 36
- B. The Communist Movement in Yugoslavia, 1919-1941..................................... 40
- C. Communism in Partisan Yugoslavia.............. 51

III. Greece..................................... 58

- A. Introduction.................................. 58
- B. The EAM....................................... 60
- C. Communism in the EAM: Various Views........... 61
- D. Hostilities between the EAM and Its Rivals.... 66
- E. The Communist Program and the EAM's Government 68
- F. EAM Affiliates and Sympathizers outside Greece 73
- G. The April Mutinies............................ 74
- H. Russian Interest in Greece.................... 75

IV. Rumania..................................... 81

- A. The Emergence of Communism in Rumania......... 81
- B. The Decline of the Movement................... 85
- C. The Revival of 1943-1944...................... 86

V. Albania...................................... 95

- A. Origin of the Communist Movement.............. 95
- B. The National Liberation Movement (LNC)........ 96
- C. The "Provisional Government" of the LNC....... 101
- D. Foreign Connections of the LNC................ 104
- E. The LNC and Its Opponents..................... 107

Introduction

The communist movement had never played a decisive positive role in any of the Balkan countries until the German occupation. In a few instances the activities of communists and the occasional election of an appreciable number of communist deputies contributed to, or served as pretexts for, the abolition of civil and political rights by the governments concerned. While the communist parties were quite active, and enjoyed an increase in membership immediately after the formation of the Third International, nothing came of their efforts. In Yugoslavia the party was outlawed as early as 1920, and in Bulgaria it was virtually paralyzed by the persecution which followed its unsuccessful attempt to stage a revolution.

All of the Balkan communist parties, whether tolerated by the law or active underground, were torn by dissension. Their doctrinaire leadership, lacking in originality, failed to appraise realistically the limited appeal that unadulterated Marxism can have for a predominantly peasant population, and failed to appreciate the revolutionary possibilities inherent in agrarian unrest and -- in the case of Yugoslavia -- in the disaffection of national groups. Even in Bulgaria where an attempt was made to stage a revolution jointly with the agrarians in 1923, it is doubtful that the communists intended after the revolt to share power with the agrarians on an equal basis. In the case of the Yugoslav Communist Party it required the intervention of the Executive Committee of the Third International in 1925 to make it assume an opportunistic position on the peasant and national question. By that time, however, this was no longer of any avail, for the Yugoslav party had been rendered ineffectual by government repression.

In Rumania, although the small parliamentary communist group advocated a workers'-peasants' republic, it did not succeed in interesting the peasants in the scheme.

Independent Labor Parties were established in Yugoslavia in 1923 and in Bulgaria in 1931, which served as legal "front" organizations for the outlawed communist parties. But they too were dissolved, and with the exception of a short-lived strong showing by the party in Bulgaria in 1931-33, the stratagem failed to produce results. In Greece the Communist Party reached its greatest strength in 1936, but it was forced underground during the same year. In Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Rumania during the "united front" period there were no outward signs to indicate increased activity on the part of the illegal Communist Parties. This was undoubtedly due in large measure to the vigilance of the police. And in Albania there was no Communist Party at all until after the German attack on Russia in the summer of 1941.

Although communists have never comprised more than a small proportion of the population in any of the three occupied Balkan countries -- Greece, Yugoslavia, and Albania -- they have nevertheless succeeded in all three in fathering the strongest organized movement of resistance to the Germans. In Bulgaria the communists made a modest and potentially important contribution toward undermining the German and pro-German forces. As far as Rumania is concerned, whatever small resistance there may have been to the Germans and their collaborators prior to the capitulation is ascribed to communists. In spite of communist initiative, the resistance movements, where they are active, grow naturally out of the local situation and would probably have developed, other conditions being equal, if the leaders involved had never heard about Marxism. They are expressions of national protest, aiming to resist the enemy now, and to establish after liberation governments which will express the popular will. Since these populations have been torn from their political moorings by the occupation, these resistance movements cannot help but be revolutionary in some of their objectives. It is difficult, however, to recognize in their programs the usual features of orthodox Marxism. To the diverse membership of these groups the word "communism" simply epitonizes their struggle for liberation. If communism in this sense has acquired new followers in considerable numbers since the occupation, it is simply because communists furnished the leadership around which the discontented could rally. Furthermore, these movements might not have been as well organized or as effective if among their leaders there had not been men schooled in underground and revolutionary techniques. In no case is the leadership composed only of Communist Party members, and communists do not constitute more than a small fraction of the rank and file of any Balkan resistance group.

During the twenties the Russian Communist Party through the Communist International intervened in Balkan communist affairs in the interest of the world-revolutionary cause. In the thirties the appeal of the Third International as a united front in opposition to fascism had little practical effect in the Balkans, in view of the fact that the communist parties had been driven underground. To be sure, throughout this period, many Balkan communist leaders found asylum in Moscow, and, although some joined the opposition to Stalin's policies, some of the more important ones proved amenable. They shifted their position as the policy of the Third International underwent a gradual re-orientation in accord with the requirements of the Soviet state. The domestic revolution having reached a point of stabilization, the Russian communists, as the bearers of the power of the Soviet state, became more concerned with the preservation of the political and institutional expression of the new Russian way of life than with promoting communist revolutions abroad. Consequently, in its relations with other states, the USSR came to behave more and more as national states are wont to act in a competitive system of power politics. After the German invasion, the Soviet government sought support wherever it could be obtained. In this effort the Soviet government attached more importance to partisan activity than did the Western Allies, and went to great lengths in stimulating national resistance movements. Since communists everywhere are accustomed to look for guidance to Moscow, it is not surprising that the Balkan communists should have been among the first to respond to the Russian appeal.

That a cleavage has developed between these resistance movements and the governments-in-exile is, to say the least, consonant with Russian preferences, and the Russians are not unmindful of the opportunity for spreading Soviet prestige and influence, an opportunity improved by the genuine admiration for the Soviet Union's success in the war.

At the same time the Russians are not repeating the mistake of underestimating national feeling. They seem to have realized that the Balkan peoples would resist the imposition of the Soviet system by Russian fiat in much the same way as they resisted the imposition of Hitler's New Order. For this reason the Russians may be expected to exercise a restraining rather than activating influence on indigenous communist parties. To be sure, when Russia appeals to the people over the heads of their governments to resist the forces of occupation, it is, in a sense a revolutionary appeal, but it is a far cry from advocating a communist revolution.

So far most of the assistance from Russia to the underground and guerrilla force has come in the form of propaganda and approbation. The Soviet radio and press heaped high praise on the Yugoslav Partisans and on the Greek EAM-ELAS. The approval of Bulgarian underground activity has been less enthusiastic, commensurate with its modest success, and in the case of Rumania, judging by the even lesser volume of comment, the Russians apparently have not expected any appreciable resistance movement to materialize.

Since Rumania and Bulgaria are in what the Soviet Union regards as its primary security zone, the Soviet government will not tolerate the establishment or maintenance in these countries of governments openly or potentially hostile to the USSR. It is improbable, however, that Russia will seek the overthrow in these countries of any regime that is neither anti-Soviet, nor Fascist or pro-Fascist. The degree of intervention on the part of the Soviet Union required to sovietize these border states would cause such an adverse reaction abroad that the possibility of further Allied cooperation with the Soviet Union would in all probability be precluded. The reaction would probably be only slightly less sharp if, for example, the Bulgarian communists were to seize power. It is for this reason, and because the Soviet Union apparently is more interested in Allied cooperation than in communist revolutions, that the Russian communists may be expected not only to exercise self-restraint but also to restrain Bulgarian communists. One thing, however, stands out fairly clearly: the Russians would like to see communist representation in the post-war government of these states, in the expectation that their support of the Soviet Union would tend to stabilize the relations of these countries with the USSR.

With regard to Greece and Yugoslavia, it is by no means certain -- in spite of the lively interest manifested by the Soviet government in Tito's Partisans and the EAM -- that the USSR regards these two countries as areas of special Russian interest and influence. They have not only remained formally correct in their official attitude, insofar as the British political stakes in these countries are concerned, but have also left the official initiative to the British government. At the same time, the Russians apparently consider the popular trend in these countries as operating in harmony with their own preferences, and looked upon the recent intervention by the British in Greek affairs with strong suspicion. This is not to say that the Russians will be carried away by their political sympathy for the Partisans and EAM to the extent of jeopardizing the chances of Allied-Russian cooperation. Should the Allies, however, actively oppose these movements with a view toward restoring a semblance of the status quo ante, such action would tend to lower the Russian estimate of the advantages of cooperation, and correspondingly strengthen their inclination to play a lone hand. For the Russians appear to look upon the attitude manifested by the Allies toward these popular movements as a criterion by which their general political orientation may be judged. This attitude, the Russians seem to believe, reflects the motives which underlie Allied policy not only toward the peoples concerned but also toward the Soviet Union and its interests. These interests, however, are apparently those of a nation bent on spreading its prestige and influence and bear little resemblance to the proselytizing zeal of the early Soviet state.

THE ROLE OF COMMUNISM IN THE BALKANS

I. BULGARIA

A. Introductory Summary: the Development of the Party

The Bulgarian Communist Party came into existence in 1919, when the left-wing faction of the Social Democratic Party -- the Tesni[1] -- severed its connections with the Second International, and took part in the founding of the Third International in Moscow. In May of the same year, two months after the formation of the Third International, the Tesni Socialists assumed the name of Bulgarian Communist Party.

The Tesni Socialists were an offshoot of the Social Democratic Party. They had broken away as a result of the schism that occurred during the meeting of the Tenth Congress of the party at Russe, 6-12 July 1903. The other faction came to be known as the Shiroki[2] Socialists. Even though it occurred a short time before the similar split in the Russian Social Democratic Party, the fact that it took place during the same year suggests the possibility that the Tesni were influenced by Lenin's advocacy of a separate organization for the revolutionary Marxists among the Russian Social Democrats. It is possible to carry the analogy a little further, and to suggest that the Tesni roughly corresponded to the Russian Bolsheviks and the Shiroki to the Mensheviks. It would be incorrect to conclude, however, that the later evolution of the Tesni group entirely paralleled that of the Russian Bolsheviks.

---

[1] The word Tesni, the literal meaning of which is "narrow," refers to the fact that the left clung to a narrow interpretation of Marxist dogma.

[2] The Shiroki (broad), or right-wing group, were freer in their attitude toward Marx. The Tesni were revolutionaries, the Shiroki moderate reformists.

The period 1903-1919 may properly be called the formative stage of Bulgarian communism. The Tesni Socialists struggled to break away completely from the evolutionary tradition and tactics which they had inherited from the parent organization, and their leaders sought to unite the members of the group in the spirit of revolutionary Marxist doctrine. The group shifted closer and closer to Bolshevism, as is evidenced by the fact that it vigorously opposed the Balkan Wars and the World War. It nevertheless remained affiliated with the Second (Socialist) International. Although mainly preoccupied with questions of Marxian doctrine, the Tesni succeeded in increasing their membership from two thousand to more than twenty thousand. They had started out without any representation in the Sobranie, the Bulgarian parliament, but managed during the same period to become one of the strongest parties.

Between 1919 and 1925, Bulgarian Communism passed through its most active, "Bolshevik" or "Leninist" phase. During this period the party's membership continued to grow very rapidly. It was led by such men as Georgi Dimitrov, V. Kolarov, and H. Kabakchiev, who followed instructions from Moscow. In 1923 the party failed in an attempt to repeat in Bulgaria the successful revolution of the Russian Bolsheviks. The "White Terror" which followed this abortive "September Uprising" not only virtually paralyzed the Communist Party but also forced several thousand Bulgarians, including the Communist leaders, to flee the country. This left the Communist Party without any experienced and capable leadership inside Bulgaria. The extreme left wing of the party, which was active from the fall of 1923 until the spring of 1925, was later disowned.

During the period 1925-1941 communists in Bulgaria were outlawed and persecuted by the government. On the surface, there appeared to be little, if any, communist activity.

The Independent Labor Party, which was organized in 1931 and was represented in the Sobranie, was suspected by certain circles of being a mere front for underground communism. The government tolerated it until 1933, when it accused it of clandestine activities and dissolved it. The fact that this party had returned thirty-one deputies to the Sobranie in the general election of 1931 indicates that there was a marked increase in communist strength, probably due in large measure to the economic depression. The leadership of the Independent Labor Party, however, had been rendered ineffective by the government in power, and the authoritarian "Zveno" coup d'état of 1934 put an end to the hope of having the party's legal status restored.

While the German-Soviet pact was in effect (1939-41), the Bulgarian communists were in a difficult position, but they obeyed Moscow's orders. Hitler's declaration of war on the USSR placed them in opposition both to Germany and to the pro-German Bulgarian government. Since then the Bulgarian communists have been making a modest but important underground contribution to the undermining of the German and pro-German forces in Bulgaria and in the Balkans.

B. The Formative Period: the Tesni Socialists

The Bulgarian Social Democratic Party, founded in the 1880's by Dimiter Blagoev, was the parent organization of Bulgarian socialism as well as of Bulgarian communism. As early as 1894, the Social Democratic Party was threatened by a rift, which actually occurred in 1903, when the left wing faction of the party separated and formed the Tesni Socialist party.

Probably the most important internal problem of the new party was that of factionalism. In 1905 a small liberal-anarchistic wing and in 1908, another faction, the so-called "progressives" were expelled. Factions which threatened the unity of the party in later years were dealt with in a similar manner. In the meantime the Tesni were growing more intolerant of the Shiroki. When Trotsky expressed himself in favor of a reunion of the Tesni and the Shiroki in 1910, the Tesni refused to follow the suggestion; and Kolarov, speaking for the party, even proposed that the Shiroki be expelled from the Second International. In 1912 at Basel, Kolarov protested against the Balkan war, and against the stand of the Shiroki, who supported it. As early as 1903 the Tesni had condemned "nationalism and militarist policies." In 1912 they denounced "the capitalistic, monarchistic" Balkan Entente, and at the same time expressed themselves unequivocally in favor of a federation of Balkan republics.

The position taken by the Tesni on these issues, however, had little influence on the course of events. This is not surprising, in view of the fact that the Tesni were not even represented in the Sobranie. In 1912 they received ten thousand votes in the general elections, but elected no deputies. After the Balkan Wars, however, they sent eleven deputies to the Sobranie, in spite of the fact that between 1912 and 1915 the actual membership of the party had increased by only 108 members. The disastrous effects of the wars doubtless prompted many non-party members to vote for Tesni candidates.[1]

---

[1] The following table (from the Great Soviet Encyclopedia) indicates the rapid growth in the membership of the Tesni party and the intensification of its activities during the period of the World War.

Year	Number of party organizations	Number of party members	Workers	Intelligentsia, small property holders and artisans	Number of party meetings	Demonstrations, meetings, public meetings
1903	-	1,174	480	694	-	-
1904	-	1,195	613	528	-	-
1905	-	1,475	774	701	-	-
1906	-	1,234	748	486	-	-
1908	-	1,661	1,103	558	542	521
1910	56	2,125	-	-	902	917
1912	92	2,923	-	-	1,465	1,634
1915	103	3,031	-	-	946	997
1919	1,166	35,478	-	-	7,846	4,880
1920	1,528	37,363	-	-	4,252	5,987
1921	1,534	38,036	-	-	16,255	5,657

On the home front, the Tesni concentrated on increasing their membership by means of frequent public meetings and demonstrations at which various phases of Marxism were explained and eulogized. By consistent opposition to the court and to the parties in power on war issues, the Tesni incurred the enmity of the ruling classes, but the party did not have to resort to undercover methods so long as its deputies were tolerated in the Sobranie.

In 1914 the Russian Bolshevik party broke away from the Second International. Although the Tesni did not follow the example of the Bolsheviks, Kirkov, the secretary of the party, protested against the "European imperialist war," and against the attitude of the Second International. Early in 1915 Dimiter Blagoev, the "dean" of the Tesni leaders, again attacked the Second International for its alleged support of "Russian, French, and British imperialism." Though represented in March of the same year (1915) at the Zimmerwald Congress, the purpose of which was to unite all left wing elements on an international scale and to form a new International, the Tesni did not join Lenin's left wing, and remained in the Second International. Nevertheless, at the end of 1915, the Tesni deputies voted against war credits and attacked the "treacherous and fratricidal policy" of the bourgeoisie and of King Ferdinand; and the party again went on record as favoring a Balkan Federation of Republics. For this action the Central Committee of the party was accused of treason, and several of its members, including Georgi Dimitrov and Todor Lukanov, were sent to prison.

The World War and its disastrous consequences for Bulgaria emboldened the Tesni, who had opposed Bulgarian participation, and had predicted the national catastrophe. Furthermore, the years which the Tesni leaders spent in prison deepened their convictions that communism could be established only through revolution. The Bolshevik Revolution at the end of 1917 convinced them that a similar movement might be successful in Bulgaria if it were properly organized and led. The Tesni therefore broke with the Second International, and took part in the founding of the Third International in Moscow in March 1919. Two months later the party changed its name from Tesni Socialists to the Bulgarian Communist Party.

C. The Period of Revolutionary Activity

For the next four years the CP engaged in vigorous preparations for revolution. This was the most intensive period of communist activity in Bulgaria. It ended in the fall of 1923 when Tsankov, leader of a quasi-fascist Bulgarian movement, put down the "September Uprising" -- the most determined attempt ever made to communize Bulgaria.

The military collapse of Bulgaria in the fall of 1918 was followed by a period of unrest and social and political disorganization. General poverty, inflation, reparations, and an influx of refugees from Macedonia and Thrace all added to the confusion of the period. A strong reaction against Ferdinand and against the bourgeois parties swept the country, when it became apparent in the summer of 1918 that Bulgaria would have to surrender. In the elections of August 1919, the Agrarians elected 85 deputies and the Communists 44 out of a total of 236. Both parties were emboldened by this success, but they had no real aim in common, and therefore could not unite. The CP used its advantageous position in the Sobranie to advertise its strength, meanwhile concealing its subversive activities whenever possible.

At the end of December 1919, it took active part in the big strike among the railway and post-office workers. The regime of the Agrarian Premier, Stamboliski, dealt ruthlessly with the strikers. The communists came out of the strike convinced that Stamboliski was as anti-communist as any other bourgeois political leader. In 1918 and 1919, the CP made important gains among the rural population. During the fall election of 1920, despite Stamboliski's anti-communist attitude, the CP increased its representation in the Sobranie to fifty deputies. When a left-wing faction of the party, known as the Iskra, opposed communist participation in the Sobranie, it was promptly expelled.

All this was particularly alarming to Stamboliski, who dreamt of a peasant "Green International" rather than of a workers' "Red International." The strength, however, of the communists alarmed not only Stamboliski's Agrarians, but also the right-wing or "bourgeois" parties. These groups felt themselves threatened on the one hand by Stamboliski's uncontrolled peasant hatred of the city, and, on the other, by the rapid growth of communism. During 1920 certain bourgeois political leaders began to organize for their part in a forthcoming three-way struggle for power. Some authorities consider the burning of the "People's House" (the communist club in Sofia) in May 1921 the beginning of hostilities. This event is described by a communist writer as the "first signal of ill omen." The CP blamed the ultra-nationalist bourgeois elements for this fire, and began to muster its forces.

In the summer of 1921, the Third Congress of the Communist International took place in Russia. Bulgarian delegates had attended the first two congresses, and now again sent a delegation led by Dimitrov. It was at this congress that Lenin set forth a policy of tactical cooperation with other parties. This foreshadowed the policy of the "united front" which later became orthodox. In 1921, the "united front" idea was based on the necessity of resorting to temporary expedients, such as cooperation with the socialists, for the purpose of achieving communist supremacy, and eventually the World Revolution. The first tentative move toward applying these tactics was made in Bulgaria.

Another important precept of the Third International was that "every party develop a system of persistent activity within trade unions, workers committees, cooperative societies, and other mass organizations of workmen." Such infiltration having been achieved, communist cells were to be formed within the various organizations and placed under party control. If the following figures given in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia are accurate, the Bulgarian CP lost no time in applying the recommendations of the Third International. At the time of the 1920 elections the CP had 37,363 members but received 182,000 votes. In 1921, they showed a striking gain in local elections, when they won a majority in eighty-seven town and village governments. In the 1922 elections the CP polled 125,000 votes in towns and 65,000 in villages, a total of 190,000 votes. In the same year, the CP showed decided strength also among the white collar workers. According to the same source, there were 2,500 communists among the state and municipal employees, 2,000 in the teachers union, 4,000 in the Women's Communist Union. The CP also claimed the support of 6,800 members of the Union of Communist Youth, 42,000 members of communist cooperatives and others. Even if these figures are exaggerated and the "cell" organization was not as effective as is claimed, the CP clearly represented a powerful revolutionary force.

Stamboliski and the anti-communist elements were still alarmed, but the agrarian Premier underestimated the danger which threatened him from the right at the same time. Powerful bourgeois forces were rapidly organizing against Stamboliski's domestic and foreign policies. Many of the white-collar workers and army officers, who had been consistently offended by the agrarians, began to plot against the regime. Compared to the agrarian population of Bulgaria (80 percent of the total) this was a very small class, and those active in organizing against Stamboliski were relatively few in number; they had, however, control of many key positions in the administration and in the army. Professor Tsankov of the University of Sofia and Colonel Ivan Volkov, head of the Topographical Institute of the Army and leader of the influential Officers' League became the leading rightist conspirators, The advance of Bolshevism in Russia had thrown to the side of the plotters some 17,000-20,000 White Russians domiciled in Bulgaria. On 9 June 1923 a coup d'etat, organized by Tsankov and Volkov, and supported by the army, the White Russians, a faction of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, and certain small but active quasi-fascist groups, overthrew Stamboliski and the Agrarians.

The CP remained neutral and inactive and the Central Committee was even accused by the agrarians of having "justified the fascist coup." The CP later maintained that it had remained neutral because of Stamboliski's previous anti-communist activities. This explanation, however, did not prevent the Executive Committee of the Communist International in Moscow from rebuking the Bulgarian CP. This rebuke was received a month after the coup d'etat, and thereupon the CP immediately began to lay plans for a "united front" against Tsankov.

To this end the Communists approached the Agrarians, the Social Democrats, the Radicals, and even the Macedonian organization. But no real union of purpose or coordination of action was achieved. In fact, the CP itself was split. The "opportunistic" faction was ready to give in to the Tsankov government, but those who followed Dimitrov and Kolarov scheduled a revolt against the government for 23 September 1923.

Vladimirov, writing in 1938 in the Communist International, is probably guilty of an overstatement when he maintains that the fighting alliance with the mass of peasantry was now a fact. The CP did try to get the support of the peasants, and a fairly large number responded. But it is apparent that the rebellion was led and dominated by the communists. The objectives of the rebellion, as reported by Vladimirov, were: to overthrow Tsankov, to establish a workers' and peasants' regime, and to organize all democratic elements around a "democratic program." The program of the communists included: placing of the reparations burden on big business; reduction in taxes for workers and peasants; nationalization of the big banks; state credit to poor peasants and workers; granting of additional land to small landholders; establishing state monopoly over foreign trade; higher wages, better housing, and social insurance. There were also provisions for a bill of rights and votes for women; dissolution of all fascist organizations; and distribution of arms to the peasants and workers for the "protection of democracy." And, finally, the program called for "peace with all nations and fraternal relations with the Soviet Union." The stress placed on the moderate, "democratic" aspect of the program leads to the supposition that the communists offered it in order to win the support of the Agrarians, without which they could not hope to overthrow the government. It is doubtful, however, whether, in the event of a successful revolution, the communists intended to share power with the Agrarians on an equal basis.

Tsankov had outlawed the CP in August. On 12 September he discovered the communist plot. As a result of this and of defections within the party, several of the district committees refused to carry out the directives of the Central Committee. Dimitrov and Kolarov led the rebellion in Northwest Bulgaria (Ferdinand, Lom, and Berkovitsa). Local uprisings took place in the Stara Zagora, Kazanluk, Chirpan, Petrich, and Sofia districts. But "opportunistic" leaders of the party organizations in Sofia, Plovdiv, Burgas, Varna, and Russe did not obey orders and did not take up arms. The rising failed, concludes Vladimirov, because "the biggest working class centers took no part in it." Kabakchiev, one of the leading Bulgarian communists, gives the following reasons for the failure of the revolt: the "tactical mistake," i.e., the inactivity of the CP during the coup of 9 June 1923, Tsankov's knowledge of and preparation for the rebellion, insufficient arms, lack of political preparation, and insufficient revolutionary experience.

Georgi Dimitrov, for many years one of the outstanding leaders of Bulgarian and international communism, commenting upon these events said: "I only regret that at that time my party and I were not yet genuinely Bolshevik. For this reason we were unable to organize successfully and carry through this historic popular uprising with the proletariat at the head. Our non-Bolshevik organization, policy and tactics, the absence of revolutionary experience, and, in particular, our opportunist, that is to say, neutral position of 9 June at the time of the military-fascist (Tsankov) coup d'état considerably aided the Bulgarian bosses and murderers of the people -- the usurpers of the state power, in suppressing the uprising of the masses." Dimitrov's use of the term "Bolshevik" suggests that he is drawing an unfavorable comparison between the success of Russian Bolshevism and the failure of the Bulgarian revolt which he himself had helped to engineer. In so doing he gives an apt description of the weakness of the communist movement in Bulgaria.

Tsankov stamped out resistance ruthlessly. Estimates of those killed in the rebellion run as high as 17,000 - 20,000. Some 4,000 communists and peasants fled to Yugoslavia, where they organized in four battalions for future action against Tsankov. The latter had, however, dealt the Bulgarian CP a crushing blow from which it has never fully recovered. The most prominent leaders fled Bulgaria. Kolarov became a member of the Presidium of the Comintern, Kabakchiev and Dimitrov members of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. The remnants of the CP split into two factions. The "liquidation" wing returned to "legal social-democratic methods," and in 1927 declared itself against the CP. The "ultra-left" wing became a terrorist organization which was especially active in 1924 and in the spring of 1925. Kabakchiev, writing several years later, stated that the CP disowned both factions.

The exact position of the CP after September 1923 is still somewhat obscure. According to the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, the Communist and Agrarian Parties received 300,000 votes in the election of October 1923, and sent thirty-five deputies to the Sobranie. Kabakchiev gives the same figure (300,000), which he estimates as one-half of all the votes cast; but he does not mention the agrarians, and leaves the impression that the figure represents pure communist strength. Neither of the two sources, however, attempts to minimize the set-back suffered by the CP in the fall of 1923.

At the end of 1923 the center of Bulgarian communist activity seems temporarily to have shifted out of the country. Under Dimitrov's leadership the exiled communists, acting according to plans made in Moscow, established their headquarters in Vienna. The ultimate goal of the Comintern now became the establishment of a Balkan Soviet Federation. The Federation Balkanique, edited by the Bulgarian Communist Nikola Harlakov, made its appearance in July 1924. The plan was to sovietize Bulgaria first, and then use it as a center for the extension of communism to the neighboring countries. Realizing that none of the Balkan countries had large "proletarian" classes, the Comintern decided that its national sections should cooperate closely with the peasant parties in the various countries.

In January 1924 G. Dimitrov and Kosta Todorov, one of the leaders of the Bulgarian agrarians in exile in Yugoslavia, met in Vienna, where Dimitrov outlined for Todorov's consideration plans for a "workers and peasants" government for Bulgaria. Dimitrov proposed a joint revolutionary committee, and promised that Moscow would provide the money and ammunition for the revolution. Todorov writes in his autobiography that he refused Dimitrov's terms, and a similar proposal made to him in Moscow some months later, because he suspected that Dimitrov was really planning for a communist dictatorship in Bulgaria and not for a coalition government. At the same time the Vienna office of the Comintern was negotiating for the support of IMRO and of the Croat Peasant party. Neither of these efforts was successful.

Meanwhile the communists and agrarians who had fled to Yugoslavia in the fall of 1923 were organizing to invade Bulgaria and overthrow Tsankov. Early in 1925 Todorov decided that conditions were auspicious for an insurrection in Bulgaria. He claims that he had available four thousand Bulgarian émigrés in Yugoslavia and three thousand "Serb volunteers," in addition to about eight thousand men in the Bulgarian frontier villages. They were poorly armed, but the Serbs had five thousand hand grenades hidden in Nish. It seems that late in March some of the communists among the according to plans made in Moscow, established their headquarters in Vienna. The ultimate goal of the Comintern now became the establishment of a Balkan Soviet Federation. The Federation Balkanique, edited by the Bulgarian Communist Nikola Harlakov, made its appearance in July 1924. The plan was to sovietize Bulgaria first, and then use it as a center for the extension of communism to the neighboring countries. Realizing that none of the Balkan countries had large "proletarian" classes, the Comintern decided that its national sections should cooperate closely with the peasant parties in the various countries.

In January 1924 G. Dimitrov and Kosta Todorov, one of the leaders of the Bulgarian agrarians in exile in Yugoslavia, met in Vienna, where Dimitrov outlined for Todorov's consideration plans for a "workers and peasants" government for Bulgaria. Dimitrov proposed a joint revolutionary committee, and promised that Moscow would provide the money and ammunition for the revolution. Todorov writes in his autobiography that he refused Dimitrov's terms, and a similar proposal made to him in Moscow some months later, because he suspected that Dimitrov was really planning for a communist dictatorship in Bulgaria and not for a coalition government. At the same time the Vienna office of the Comintern was negotiating for the support of IMRO and of the Croat Peasant party. Neither of these efforts was successful.

Meanwhile the communists and agrarians who had fled to Yugoslavia in the fall of 1923 were organizing to invade Bulgaria and overthrow Tsankov. Early in 1925 Todorov decided that conditions were auspicious for an insurrection in Bulgaria. He claims that he had available four thousand Bulgarian emigrés in Yugoslavia and three thousand "Serb volunteers," in addition to about eight thousand men in the Bulgarian frontier villages. They were poorly armed, but the Serbs had five thousand hand grenades hidden in Nish. It seems that late in March some of the communists among the

Bulgarian emigrés tried to place the entire emigré force under their own control. Among the Bulgarian communist leaders in Yugoslavia, Gavril Genov, described by Kosta Todorov as "Georgi Dimitrov's lieutenant" played a prominent part in the attempted coup, which Todorov describes as "an eleventh hour communist attempt to destroy everything we had been building up since the fall of 1923."

On 14 April 1925 an attempt on the life of King Boris was made while he was motoring through the Balkan mountains. The same day General Konstantin Georgiev was assassinated in Sofia. Then on 16 April, a time bomb placed on the roof of the Sofia cathedral and set to go off during General Georgiev's funeral service, exploded killing more than 125 persons and wounding many more. The government charged the communists with the plot and took ruthless measures against them. In an article in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, Joffe denies that the CP had any part in the cathedral outrage. Such an act, he says, is against the party rule not to engage in "individual terror." Kosta Todorov, however, places the responsibility squarely on the communists, stating that early in March (1925) Gavril Genov bought several hundred kilograms of ecrasite, a powerful explosive that could be had only in Yugoslavia, and sent it to Lt. Colonel Yankov in Sofia. The communists then bribed the sexton of the Sveta Nedelia Cathedral to plant in the cupola a time bomb they had made of about 50 kilograms of ecrasite. The whole truth about this episode is not yet known. There is little doubt, however, that the Bulgarian people as a whole believed that the communists had perpetrated the crime. Communists were ruthlessly persecuted, and communism became discredited in Bulgaria. The gulf between the CP and the people widened. The CP had lost most of the ground that it had gained during twenty-two years of arduous work.

The year 1925 also marks the end of the most active period in the history of Bulgarian communism. From 1919 until 1925 the CP had followed what its leaders believed to be a Bolshevik line. Their rigid adherence to dogma, however, prevented them from taking advantage of the opportunity to defeat Tsankov's regime at its inception. In the words of a prominent Bulgarian communist, the Bulgarian CP did not understand "the essence of the united front as developed by Lenin.... It was unable to combine a Leninist staunch adherence to principles with the greatest elasticity" of tactics.

D. Communism on the Defensive, 1925-1935

In 1925, Bulgarian communism entered a relatively inactive period. Tsankov had banned the CP in April 1924, thus depriving it of its representation in the Sobranie. What remained of the party was driven underground. Emphasis began to be placed on propaganda and restoration of the contact between the CP and the people, which had all but disappeared. Too weak to act of its own accord, the CP realized, according to Kolarov, that "the political consciousness of the masses and international conditions were such that it was considered impossible to establish Soviet authority in Bulgaria at that particular time." The CP was forced by circumstances to compromise; hence it was willing to back a purely agrarian government; "which rested on the broad working masses." In spite of its admitted weakness the party issued the following program:

1. Defeat of the Tsankov government.
2. Repeal of the "law for the protection of the state" (which worked against the CP).
3. Restoration of political liberties.
4. Full and unconditional amnesty for political prisoners.

The announcement of this program was accompanied by a warning to the ruling class that its repressive measures were driving the masses toward rebellion, and that the CP would line up with the masses.

All this produced no results. Conscious of the weakness of the Bulgarian CP and perhaps of the communist parties in the neighboring countries, the Comintern made an unsuccessful but significant attempt to achieve the goals of communism in all Balkan countries simultaneously. In an article published in the Communist International in July 1925 Georgi Dimitrov lists the following three points under the sub-title "Problems of the Balkan Communist Federation":

1. Coordination of the efforts of the separate national organizations.
2. Popularization of the idea of a Balkan Federation among the masses.
3. Intensification of the struggle against the nationalistic and chauvinistic policies of the Balkan nationalistic governments and dynasties.

Communist writers took this occasion to remind their followers, and the public in general that the idea of a Balkan federation of Soviet republics dated as far back as 1910, and that its creation offered the only hope for the solution of Balkan national and territorial questions. After 1924-25 this idea receded into the background again, and the various national communist organizations received separate consideration in the councils of the Comintern.

The major concern of the Bulgarian communists was to re-establish contact with the people. This was the first step which communist leaders hoped would eventually place the Communist Party in the vanguard of the proletarian revolution. One of the main avenues of approach was through the trade unions.

The severe economic conditions of the middle twenties (some communist sources estimate that there were more than 130,000 unemployed in Bulgaria out of a total of 500,000 workers) rendered the masses more susceptible to communist propaganda. But, in trying to get control over the professional unions, the communists ran into serious competition from the Social Democrats. Communist sources report that in the middle twenties there were more than 35,000 members in the so-called independent professional unions (these unions were actually dominated by the communists) and only 1,000-1,500 members in "Menshevik" or Social-Democratic professional unions. On 21 July 1926, a congress of trade unions was held in Sofia for the purpose of placing all unions under one central guiding and controlling body. The important question was whether or not the unions would be affiliated with the Second (Socialist or Amsterdam) International. Under existing conditions affiliation with the Third International was out of the question, since the government would have dissolved the proposed union immediately. Eventually, on the insistence of the independent unions, the question of affiliation with the Amsterdam International was left pending.

Throughout the early and middle part of 1926 there was a good deal of discontent among the workers as well as among the much more numerous peasantry. A demand for an amnesty bill early in 1926 was supported not only by workers and peasants but also by the bourgeoisie, in spite of the fact that most of those who were in jails for political reasons were communists, and agrarians. The bill was passed by the new Liapchev government in February 1926, and freed several thousand political prisoners.

The professional union movement expanded eventually into the so-called "trudov" or labor bloc, which in turn gave rise on 20 February 1927 to the Workers Party, and to its party organ the Workers' Action. This party was committed to the idea of the class struggle, but kept this view a secret. When a number of "renegades" formed the Independent Workers Party with its organ New Road the government and the bourgeois press singled it out and heaped praise on it, ignoring the Workers Party, which the Liapchev government did not trust. Later in 1927, just before the parliamentary elections, the so-called "iron" bloc of peasants, workers, and Social Democrats was formed. It aimed at the restoration of parliamentary and democratic procedures. The communists felt that the task of rebuilding their party from the bottom up would be much easier if democratic parliamentary freedom prevailed in Bulgaria. But the "iron" bloc too was soon liquidated, and many of its leaders passed over to the government side. The outlook for communism in Bulgaria was gloomy in the latter part of 1927. Writing in the Communist International in the spring of 1928 Vasil Kolarov concluded that, "in the absence of immediate revolutionary situations," the Bulgarian communists had to concentrate on combatting the "reformist theories of the Social Democrats as well as the liquidation and capitulation factions among the small bourgeois intelligentsia." Under the heavy blows of the police, many would-be communists gave up the fight either by going over to the Social Democrats or by outright submission to the government. In the midst of this demoralization in the ranks of the Bulgarian communists, Vasil Kolarov came out with a program of action, published in the Communist International, organ of the Comintern. The program was entitled "Problems of the Bulgarian Communist Party in connection with the Danger of War," and proposed: to explain to the masses the dangers of war which was being prepared by the great imperialistic powers and the part which Balkan nationalism and the Balkan bourgeois parties were to play in it if left unchecked; to expose the true nature of the League of Nations and such deceptive ideas advanced by bourgeois governments as peace, disarmament, arbitration, protection of national minorities, etc.; to expose the Second International, especially the Bulgarian Social Democrats, "as direct or indirect participants in the preparation of the bourgeois war against the Soviets"; to explain the meaning of the proletarian revolution; to raise the slogan of a Balkan Federation of Soviet Republics as the only means of preventing war in the Balkans; and to popularize the idea of transforming a possible imperalist war into a civil war. More specifically, Bulgarian communists were instructed to coordinate their action against war with those of the other Balkan communist parties; and to fight against reparations, against nationalism, and against the bourgeoisie.

Having outlined the general principles of the struggle, Kolarov undertook to instruct the Bulgarian communists how to proceed with their work. They should begin by realizing that in the Balkans "the decisive voice on the subject of war belongs to the peasant masses." The most important task of any Balkan communist party was the transformation of the pacifism of the peasants into an active revolutionary struggle against the imperialism of the Balkan bourgeoisie. In addition to the peasants, the refugees from Macedonia and Thrace, reduced to poverty, must be drawn into the struggle. The Comintern considered the "enslaved districts" (Macedonia and Thrace) fertile ground for communist propaganda. It was also recommended that work be carried on among women, invalids, war orphans, laborers of all kinds, peasant youth, in the army, navy, and labor corps, and among sports and other organizations, the main objective being the "awakening of the initiative of the masses." All legal and illegal means were recommended if they helped "the struggle against imperialism and fascist dictatorship."

These efforts of the Comintern at the end of the 1920's to keep alive communism in Bulgaria were not fruitless. Because of the tireless activities of the Comintern and its agents, and possibly also because of the economic depression which caused much suffering in Bulgaria at the turn of the decade, communism experienced a notable revival in the early 1930's. In the relatively free general elections in June 1931 the newly created legal workers party known as the Independent Labor Party (ILP) elected thirty-one deputies out of a total of 263. This parliamentary group was led by the Sofia lawyer, Lyuben Dyukmedzhiev.[1] As a result of the same elections the Liapchev government was overthrown, to be succeeded by Malinov, titular head of the Democrats and a few months later by Mushanov, leader of the Democratic party. But these governments did not tolerate underground communist activities any more than their predecessors, and, in the fall of 1931, a wave of anti-communist activity spread throughout Bulgaria. On 30 October, police killed in Sofia Nikola Kofardzhiev, described in the Communist International as Secretary of the Bulgarian CP, and as "the true pioneer of the general policy of the Comintern in Bulgaria." Several days later Hristo Kochev and Tsacho Nenov, accused respectively of being treasurer and director of the technical section of the Central Committee of the

---

[1] Dyukmedzhiev, together with another communist leader Todor Pavlov, was released from concentration camp a few months ago, presumably as a concession to Russian demands.

BCP, were arrested. They were later killed. In Sofia, Plovdiv, Sliven, Tatar Pazardzhik, and other cities many men and women were held in prisons for questioning. The exact relationship between Kofardzhiev and the parliamentary group of the ILP is not known, but the Minister of Justice described the legal workers party as "only another form of the CP." The government also alleged that they had captured the CP archives, and that there was a special item in the budget listing contributions of the parliamentary group for the support of illegal and subversive propaganda. The government charged the communists with a plot to seize power by means of an armed uprising. In local elections, the communists made important gains, and seemed to be regaining a firm grip on the peasantry. This further alarmed the government.

At the same time a wave of strikes swept Bulgaria.[1] Especially important to the communist cause were labor disputes and frequent strikes in the two largest industries, the tobacco and the textile, employing a total of about 70,000 workers in 1933. Strikes started ordinarily as disputes about wages and working conditions; but the CP injected the political element into what had originally been economic disputes. While the CP was aware of the growing importance of the industrial proletariat in Bulgaria, it did not overlook the fact that many of the textile workers, for instance, were peasants; and it used them to spread communist propaganda among the peasantry. The growing importance of women workers also became apparent. Of the

---

[1]

Year	Number of strikes	Number of strikers	In textile and tobacco industry
1929	60	35,000	30,000
1930	62	25,000	20,000
1931	198	34,000	25,000

70,000 workers employed in the tobacco and textile industries in 1933, 80 percent were women. In the same year the CP devoted much attention to other key trade unions, such as the coal miners' union in Pernik, and the transport and post office workers union.

Though Prime Minister Mushanov declared that there were no more than 12,000 "true" communists in Bulgaria, the communists in the Sofia municipal election in the fall of 1932 won nineteen out of thirty-five seats on the city council. But the government refused to surrender the Sofia municipal council to the communist majority. At the end of January 1933 Hristo Traikov, a communist deputy, was killed. In March, the Central Committee of the legal union of working youth was arrested and charged with espionage. Finally, on 1 May the government published a law which disbanded all legal workers organizations. The government also banned news of Georgi Dimitrov's part in the Reichstag fire trial, which was receiving wide publicity in the world's press.

Conditions in Bulgaria looked so favorable to the Comintern at the end of 1932 that its Executive Committee at the twelfth plenum considered the possibility of a sudden revolt. The energetic and ruthless measures of the Mushanov government, however, put an end to Communist hopes for an early revolution. Bulgarian communists were again unable to take advantage of a favorable situation, and again became the object of severe criticism from Moscow. The Comintern warned the Bulgarian communists that capitalism would not die automatically and that action against it was necessary.

This time Stalin himself advised the Bulgarians in these words: "...it is necessary for the Bulgarian CP to overcome and remove not only the parliamentary, legalistic influences, but also the doctrinaire factional survivals of the 'Tesni' feudalism which hinders the bolshevization of the Bulgarian CP."

As in 1923, when the Bulgarian communists had failed to unite with the agrarians and prevent Tsankov's coup d'état, so in 1932-3 criticism from Moscow spurred the party into action. The Communist International reported in its April issue that eighteen different organizations carried on revolutionary work in Bulgaria. Among them were a variety of political, labor, sports, cultural, and other associations. The Workers Party counted 35,000 members, according to the same source, and the Komsomol an additional 20,000 members. But the Zveno[1] coup d'état, 19 May 1934, did not make the existence of Bulgarian communists easier. By a general decree, the new Zveno government dissolved all political parties and organizations and set up an authoritarian regime. This 1934 decree dissolving political parties and organizations has never been revoked.

Although it was the first Bulgarian government to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR, the Zveno regime proposed to undermine communism within Bulgaria through social and economic reforms. Persecution of communists continued throughout 1934 as before. During the Sevlievo trials in that year, for instance, ninety-three persons, a large number of whom were boys and girls under twenty years of age, were accused of subversive communist activities. After the fall of the Zveno government in January 1935, King Boris gradually consolidated his own personal power. The several regimes dominated by him remained hostile to communism.

---

1. A political club, with strong Army connections, which favored authoritarian domestic measures to keep order, and good relations externally with the Balkan countries and the USSR.

E. Bulgarian Communism and the Popular Front, 1935 - 1941

The year 1935 marks the beginning of a new period in Bulgarian communism. After the party had proved unable to take full advantage of its strength in the early 1930's, its leadership was changed, and party discipline was tightened. But even more important was the decision taken by the Comintern at its VII Congress in August 1935 to create a united "people's anti-fascist front" in Bulgaria. The Comintern was aware of Hitler's plans for eventual war against Russia, and hastened to take counter measures. Bulgarian communists, it was agreed, could best serve the cause by fighting fascism at home. The first expression of renewed communist activity was a new wave of strikes which spread throughout Bulgaria late in 1935 and in 1936. These strikes involved the powerful tobacco and textile unions and many lesser ones. The government again acted speedily and outlawed all strikes.

While this was taking place the communists made attempts to form the "people's anti-fascist front." This front was to rest on a broad basis, attracting, if possible, all non-fascist elements. A political program was proposed based on the restoration of the Bulgarian Constitution. Immediate general elections were demanded, as well as the establishment of a democratic regime and removal of certain economic restrictions. The Communists expected to attract broad support by means of these concrete proposals, and then to create local committees of adherents of the front. They made a special effort to win the Agrarian party and the Social Democrats but the initial response was very cool. The Agrarians and Social Democrats suspected the communists, and labelled the proposed front a "communist manoeuver." They were especially distrustful of the suggested local committees, which they feared would become communist cells. In spite of this difficulty, the Agrarians and

Social Democrats agreed eventually on principle to the People's Front. This strengthened a working agreement which had been reached early in 1935 by the youth organizations of all three parties, the Comsomol, Socmol, and the Peasant Youth Union. Eventually even the anarchists were admitted into the People's Front. But the mutual distrust between the communists and the other parties, and the obstructionist tactics of the Agrarian and Social Democratic leaders weakened the Front considerably. Even admonitions of the VII Congress of the Comintern were not sufficient to remove deep-rooted prejudices among the Communists, many of whom still considered the Agrarians and Social Democrats their enemies.

Despite the serious internal weaknesses of the People's Front, it achieved certain successes for the anti-fascist cause in Bulgaria. During the municipal elections in March 1937 the anti-fascist opposition did not put up its own candidates but voted with a ballot inscribed "for restoration of the Tirnovo Constitution." According to the Communist International, 30 percent of all votes were cast for this slogan. The Comintern, however, criticized the Bulgarian communists for failure to agree on a compromise roster of candidates in cooperation with the other anti-fascist forces. This weakness was overcome a year later, when the loosely held parties of the People's Front formed the so-called Constitutional Bloc. The nucleus of this bloc was a committee formed in 1936 after the government put down the strikes, and banned the professional unions. The committee was composed of representatives of the five democratic parties ("the five"): the Agrarians, the Social Democrats, the Radicals, the Liberals, and part of the Democrats. Before the 1938 general elections the Communist Party and the Pladne[1] Agrarians joined "the five" to form the Constitutional

---

[1] A left-wing group named from their paper, Pladne (Noon).

Bloc. The platform of the Bloc included three planks: (1) restoration of constitutional freedom; (2) improvement of the economic conditions of workers and peasants; and (3) fight against war and aggression. According to the Communist International, the Bloc received about 1,000,000 votes out of a total of about 1,500,000, but, because of the Bulgarian electoral law, the Bloc was given only 63 seats in Parliament out of a total of 160.

The Comintern also criticized the propaganda of the Bulgarian communists, who were censured for repeating that Bulgaria was an imperialist power, and for neglecting the important fact "that a significant part of unquestionably Bulgarian population remained under foreign yoke and suffered national humilation." The Comintern realized that Hitler's most effective line of propaganda in Bulgaria was the claim that the Nazis were champions of those who suffered from the Versailles peace treaties. The Bulgarian communists, therefore, were advised to remember that: "The struggle against the unfair peace treaties and the protection of oppressed national minorities is the duty of the democratic powers."

In spite of the wide popular support behind the Constitutional Bloc, it was not a well-knit "people's front." The efforts of the communists to create local committees representative of the Constitutional Bloc were met with the usual distrust and suspicion on the part of the other parties. Moreover, the communists had no direct representatives in the Sobranie. Had they put up any communist candidates for election, the government would probably have dissolved the Constitutional Bloc. Instead of controlling the Bloc, the communists had actually surrendered to the moderate left and center parties, in order to achieve at least some measure of united and articulate opposition to the dictatorial government. The 1938 election platform of the Constitutional Bloc contains nothing revolutionary, and the only concession to the communists is a vague promise that the economic condition of the workers would be improved. Real influence and power in Bulgaria's political life had again eluded the Communists. They continued to support the Constitutional Bloc in the Sobranie, although they considered its representatives too timid and ineffective. They concentrated on winning popular support through "non-political" organizations. After 1938 the communists redoubled their efforts to control the professional unions. But this task had been rendered difficult because, after the 1936 strikes, the government sponsored its own professional unions, whose leaders were not elected but chosen for their loyalty to the government. In spite of this, the communists seem to have made some progress among the rank and file in the professional unions.

When the Germans signed their non-aggression pact with Soviet Russia in August 1939, King Boris decided to establish closer relations with the USSR. It was expected that this move would be extremely popular with the Bulgarian people and would also undermine the communists in Bulgaria. The year 1940 opened with trade negotiations between the USSR and Bulgaria. Bozhilov, then Minister of Finance, signed in Moscow (5 January) a commercial treaty based on the most-favored-nation clause. In March, the first Soviet transport plane arrived in Bulgaria on a new commercial line linking Moscow and Sofia. On 7 August a Soviet soccer team arrived in Sofia to play a Bulgarian team. The latter occasion is notable because of the spontaneous demonstrations of good will which the population of Sofia gave the Soviet team. The underground CP had instructed its adherents to organize a demonstration of good will toward the Russians. But what took place spontaneously appears to have exceeded even their most optimistic expectations. More than 120,000 of Sofia's population turned out in the streets to greet and cheer the Soviet players. The incident is recounted as an illustration of the difficulty frequently encountered in Bulgarian affairs, in distinguishing between communist-organized demonstrations and the spontaneous expression of pro-Russian sentiment.

In 1940 the Soviet government was making a determined effort to win over Bulgaria. The communists were thus placed in an extremely awkward position, since they could carry on propaganda neither against Germany, with whom the Soviet Union had a non-aggression pact, nor against the Bulgarian government, with which the Soviets were negotiating.

When in September Rumania ceded Southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria in the Treaty of Craiova, to the intense satisfaction of the Bulgarians, the Russians tried to claim credit for the cession, although it was clear that the Germans had been responsible for Rumania's consent to the treaty. The Nazis had scored a victory in Bulgaria, but the Soviet government refused to give up. Aware of this, the Bulgarian communists demanded that Bulgaria sign a mutual assistance pact with the USSR. In a manifesto issued at the end of the summer in which the Bulgarian government was referred to as a "fascist dictatorship," this demand was repeated. During the first half of September the communists again protested against the government's pro-German policy and warned that such policy would lead Bulgaria to disaster "as it did in 1915." This quickened activity was a prelude to what was to be the last attempt on the part of the USSR to win Bulgaria over to its side. At the end of November, Sobolev, Secretary of the Russian Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, proposed to King Boris a "Soviet guarantee of Bulgaria's frontiers"; but Boris refused the offer. Thereafter, it became apparent to the USSR that Boris had committed himself to Germany.

The Bulgarian communists, meanwhile, continued to censure the government for its pro-German policy. At the end of January

1941 the party again demanded "the immediate conclusion of a treaty with the USSR," and on 20 February it organized peace demonstrations. However, when the Germans marched into Bulgaria on 1 March 1941, the communists remained inactive. They "instructed their followers not to cooperate with the forces of occupation but also to avoid inimical acts." This attitude was dictated by the fact that Germany and Soviets were still bound by the non-aggression pact of August 1939. When nearly four months later Germany attacked Russia, the attitude of the Bulgarian communists changed at once. In June 1941 they abandoned "legal" methods and became active in the underground.

F. The Communists in the Bulgarian Underground, 1941 - 1944

The exact composition of the Bulgarian underground is not known. It is clear, however, that the great majority of its members are communists. It is organized on communist patterns, and is inspired and probably supported by Moscow. Whatever left, agrarian, or bourgeois elements there maybe in the underground have most probably embraced the present communist program of action. Furthermore there has been a rapid growth of the so-called "new communism." It is reliably reported that many Bulgarians among the bourgeoisie and even among the wealthy class want an alliance with the USSR, and are even willing to accept curbs on Bulgaria's post-war sovereignty if such an alliance would assure them what they consider a fair degree of national and territorial unity. This "new communism" has no ideological common ground with Marxism or Bolshevism, and those who subscribe to it are not active in the underground; but their political influence is considerable and may measurably weaken the position of the pro-German forces in Bulgaria.

The Bulgarian communists as such have not announced a program. But since the program of the Fatherland Front, the umbrella organization of the underground, corresponds closely with the main points in an article by Georgi Dimitrov (published in Pravda, 27 December 1943), it is probably safe to assume that the communists subscribe to the tenets of the Fatherland Front. The program includes: immediate termination of the alliance with Germany, and of exports to the Reich; revocation of the declaration of war against England and the United States; recall of the Bulgarian troops in Yugoslavia, and cooperation with the Yugoslav Partisans in driving all German troops and Gestapo agents out of Bulgaria; protection of Bulgarian national interests in accordance with the Atlantic Charter, establishment of friendly relations and collaboration with other Balkan peoples, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the United States, "and other freedom-loving peoples"; "liquidation" of the Bulgarian fascist government and fascist organization; removal of fascist control from the Bulgarian army; freeing of political prisoners; restoration of civil rights and abolition of racial discrimination; defense of "national, economic, political, and labor interests against foreign interference." To achieve all these aims the Fatherland Front advocates overthrow of the government and establishment of a provisional government which would call a Grand National Assembly to determine the future form of government.

This program is urged upon all Bulgarians in order that they "may achieve a truly national policy and a genuinely Bulgarian government." That the accent is on national unity is further shown by the fact that certain controversial issues such as the question of the monarchy and territorial claims are left for future solution, the first by a representative assembly, the second, " in a spirit of friendship" and in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter. The statement about the advancement of the welfare of the working people of town and country, at least on the face of it, does not call for a subversion of the economic system, and that about foreign exploitation is more nationalistic than revolutionary. Obviously the program is designed to attract everyone and to repel no one except avowed collaborationists and uncompromising irredentists.

Estimates of the number of Bulgarian guerrillas vary between 1,000 and 60,000. The first figure was given in a public speech by the Bulgarian Minister of Interior several months ago, and is surely an understatement. The second figure is undoubtedly too high. It is probable that 10,000 - 15,000 is more nearly right. In addition, prisons and concentration camps hold many thousands of potential adherents.

The underground has been reported to be divided into two "armies," the Army of the Rhodope, operating from the Rhodope Mountains and the Army of the Balkans, operating from the Balkan Mountains. Each of the armies is subdivided into 200-250 small bands controlled by cells consisting of several members each. In organization and discipline the armies follow military lines. They are said to be using a military recruiting system. Students from Plovdiv, Tschirpan, Karlovo, and Panagyurishte are said to have responded to recruiting appeals. A medical unit has been organized including six nurses from the Stara-Zagora Hospital. Some of the most ardent members of the underground are said to be youthful idealists, who are called "shumtsi" (forest men). Many of them are former university students. It is significant that students of Sofia University put up a determined fight last November against an attempt on the part of the government to make compulsory membership in the quasi-fascist youth organization, Brannik.

While this youthful element is naturally the most active and also the most extreme, the underground bands include older members, teachers, lawyers, and other professional men, as well as Soviet-trained communists dropped by parachute or smuggled through Rumania.

Occasionally it is reported that small groups of soldiers and officers join the underground. It is impossible to estimate their number or the number of those reported to have joined Tito's forces, but so far desertions from the army have not assumed mass proportions. The Minister of Interior several months ago publicly admitted that there were communists among the local mayors. Government supporters have demanded that the civil service be purged of communist sympathizers. However, nothing seems to alarm the government as much as the spread of communism to the villages. The daily, Utro, declared in January 1944 that to combat communism among the peasants is the first responsibility of the government.

In November 1943 the Bozhilov government granted an amnesty to Shumtsi, apparently hoping to win them over to its side. The results of this attempt were so meager that the government turned to reliance on its police and the Gestapo, and on the Bulgarian fascist elements to combat communism. Also, a highly mobile "gendarmerie" has been created out of trusted government adherents, but it is reported that this force has aroused the jealousy and antagonism of professional army men. The government seems unwilling to entrust the army with the job of policing the country, not only because it may be needed for other tasks, but also because its rank and file cannot be relied on to carry out orders against the underground.

The activities of the underground vary greatly according to place and circumstances. To get arms, ammunition, and provisions is a major problem in spite of the assistance which the Soviets may be providing. This explains the reports of isolated attacks by communist bands on villages in every part of Bulgaria for the purpose of seizing arms. Communications in Bulgaria and Macedonia have been one of the main targets of the underground. On at least one occasion a German military train carrying tanks was attacked and blown up. The so-called "Hristo Botev" battalion, named after a nineteenth century Bulgarian poet and revolutionist, operating in Macedonia, is reported to have carried out extensive railroad sabotage. Such unpopular administrators as Spasov, assistant chief of the State Security Department at Russe, have been done away with. Other victims have included Pantev, former chief of police, reported as pro-German; and General Lukov, one of the most influential pro-Germans in Bulgaria.

Clandestine radio and leaflet propaganda has long been an effective weapon in the hands of the communists and the underground. Leaflets known as "pozivi" are distributed at night under doorsteps and in little boxes. Extensive use is made of inscriptions on walls. The case of Dr. Alexander Peev, who was executed for transmitting by means of a secret radio, caused much speculation and indignation in Sofia in November 1943.

It is known that the Bulgarian underground has given increasing support to Marshal Tito for some time. In addition to the Hristo Botev battalion, which has been active in Macedonia, a Bulgarian detachment with all its equipment went over to the Partisans in December 1943. It is probable that contact between the Bulgarian underground in old Bulgaria and Tito's forces is maintained through the Macedonian Partisan Organization -- an autonomous command with its own staff but affiliated with Tito's Partisans.

These activities of the Bulgarian communists have not assumed the proportions of sustained attacks. They must rather be viewed as attempts to obstruct the activities of the German occupational forces in Bulgaria and of the pro-German Bulgarian government. The communists have never again displayed the strength, leadership, and organization which enabled them in the fall of 1923 to make a determined effort for political control of Bulgaria. The closest the Bulgarian communists have come in recent years to a bid for power was the rising in October 1941 in the Drama-Kavalla region of Thrace. Information about this insurrection is extremely meager, but it appears that the rising was organized jointly by Bulgarian and Greek communists. The insurgents captured a number of villages and attacked the railroad station at Drama, but were subdued by German and Bulgarian forces.

Appendix: BULGARIANS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST COUNCILS

No account of Bulgarian communism would be complete without at least a brief mention of the part which Bulgarian communists have played in the affairs of the USSR and in international communist councils. Many Bulgarians have played leading roles in the service of the Soviet Union and other outside forces. Among their number have been Krustyu Rakovski, former Premier of the Soviet Ukraine and former Soviet ambassador to France and to Great Britain; Kuzman Stoikov, a Bulgarian army officer who became commander of a Soviet Army; Nikola Harlakov, editor of the Federation Balkanique, published in Vienna in the 1920's; Dimiter Vlahov, who worked for many years for a Soviet Balkan Federation and is at present Vice President of Tito's Anti-Fascist Council; Vasil Kolarov, former member of the Presidium of the Comintern; Hristo Kabakchiev, former member of the Executive Council of the Comintern; and finally, Georgi Dimitrov, former Secretary of the Third International, former Member of the Executive Council of the Comintern, and former director of the Comintern for Western Europe and the Americas, and the central figure in the Reichstag Fire Trial.

II. YUGOSLAVIA

A. Introduction: the Problem

Yugoslavia, founded after the first World Was as the Kingdom of the Serbs, the Croats, and the Slovenes, was beset from the first by administrative problems which at times almost forced its dissolution as a country. The victorious Serbs, returning to their country after years of war and suffering found themselves rulers of a hastily created state vastly expanded by the inclusion of the Croat and Slovene lands liberated from Habsburg domination. The Serb dynasty with its Serb army, ruling from a Serb capital, with an administration largely Serb, tended to centralize all power in its own hands, and to make of Yugoslavia in effect a Greater Serbia. The Croats opposed this policy, and moderates among them strove for greater local autonomy, while the extremists favored a completely independent Croatia. Through long years of violent incidents the question of federalism or centralization was debated; a satisfactory compromise was never found. Moreover the ruling clique did not in practice govern according to the democratic principles of the Constitution; and paid little attention to the economic needs of the peasants, who made up 80 percent of the population.

Within less than ten years after the creation of the Kingdom the Royal regime (1929) moved to abrogate the constitution, to deny individual liberties, and to establish a dictatorship accompanied by police terror. This increase of centralization provoked widespread unrest, and created a fertile ground for agitation appealing to class interest. Moreover, agrarian reform was a program popular with the people of the former Austro-Hungarian provinces; inflation had everywhere aggravated popular discontent; a housing shortage led to speculation and usury at the expense of the peasants.

Yet the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, under doctrinaire and unimaginative leadership and plagued by factionalism, apparently did not take advantage of these opportunities for political activity until the late twenties, when it had been driven underground and greatly weakened; and even then only after some prodding by Moscow. Before this time its propaganda was unrelated to the main domestic issues which beset the Yugoslav people. The outgrowth of a small Serbian Marxist group which had opposed participation in the Balkan and World Wars, it always had more sympathizers than members. But it did not adjust its ideology to the needs of a predominantly peasant country with an insignificant industrial proletariat; nor did it avail itself of the possibilities offered by the conflict over Serb hegemony, and the centralization of power. After the establishment of the royal dictatorship in 1929, all opportunities for communist activity except for some furtive work in factories, affecting only small groups, disappeared.

Government opposition to radical political groups began almost as soon as the Yugoslav state was established; the communists were the first to feel discrimination. In 1920, the election of fifty-eight communist deputies was annulled. The Croat Peasant Party, a powerful agrarian group, containing both conservative and radical elements, but favoring Croatian autonomy, was also several times dissolved and declared illegal, on the basis of a law for the security of the State. So was the Serb Democratic Party, a liberal group who favored federalism. The economic crisis helped to stimulate the political discontent aroused by such moves, and since all overt opposition to the regime was proscribed, new underground organizations were constantly coming into existence.

By no means all of this activity was communist-directed or even communist-inspired. The Yugoslav Communist Party was far too insignificant to take the lead in crystallizing the general popular discontent. The royal government, however, attached the communist label to any group which advocated political or social changes that threatened to diminish its power. Whenever a political offense was committed -- and the law defined a large variety of acts as political crimes -- the alleged offender, who might often be guilty of nothing but the exercise of free speech, or of any of a number of other civil liberties, was arrested and booked on the charge of being a communist, irrespective of his party affiliation. The word "communist" became synonymous with "opponent of the government." The people at large tended to accept the label; if they opposed the regime, they might even call themselves "communists" whether they belonged to the party or not.

Under German occupation of Yugoslavia, the original resistance group led by Mihailovich gradually took on the characteristics of the former Yugoslav regime, which indeed continued in exile, and appointed Mihailovich its Minister of War. The Chetnik Movement is exclusively Serb, and its leader, authoritarian in his views, laid himself open to strong suspicions of collaboration with quislings, Italians, and Germans. The Partisan movement arose in opposition to the Mihailovich program as well as to the Axis. It is the direct outgrowth of the opposition to the regime of King Alexander.

Apparently realizing their previous ineptitude, the communists have developed and sponsored a political program which has enabled them to take the lead among the Partisans. With valuable experience in underground activity, with military training often received during the 30's in Russia and in Spain, they rose to the top of the Partisan movement, and still occupy a leading place in it. The Partisan program includes: federalism, political democracy, civil liberties, peasant cooperatives, freedom of religion, private property, and no bolshevisation. All this has attracted those Yugoslavs of all nationalities, religions, and political views, who opposed the old regime. Just as the old opposition frequently called itself communist, without being communist, so many Partisans have adopted the name as the mere symbol of their membership in the new opposition.

There is still strong dislike for and fear of the Partisan movement in many sectors of the Yugoslav population. The quisling Serb regime of Nedich, and the Mihailovich Chetniks naturally oppose it; but many Serb peasants also distrust it. They are persuaded that it is anti-dynastic, and many fear that they will lose their land in some Bolshevik collectivization program, or that the Croats will dominate the country. The Croat extremists of Pavelich, who dominate the "Independent" State of Croatia created by the Germans, are also anti-Partisan, and have regularly collaborated with the Axis and the Chetniks against them. Moreover, Machek, leader of the once powerful Croat Peasant Party, who has lost much of his prestige by his refusal to participate in politics since the German occupation, apparently opposes the Partisans also. Many of his former followers, on the other hand, have gone over to Tito, and maintain that in so doing they have upheld the political tradition of the party. It is not easy to determine the degree to which concern over his political future has motivated Machek's stand. Many Slovenes, too, especially the active clericals, who fear that the Partisans intend to bolshevize their country, oppose the Partisan movement. Yet it is proportionately stronger in Slovenia than anywhere else in Yugoslavia. Despite this opposition, the movement is strong, and gaining strength.

The communists have apparently concluded that doctrinaire Marxism is unsuitable for Yugoslavia. They have submerged their early desire for a revolution in the new Partisan program, and have thus aided in creating a movement which presents effective opposition to the enemy in time of war, and says that it plans in time of peace to rule the country in accordance with the popular will.

B. The Communist Movement in Yugoslavia, 1919-1941

The Communist Party of Yugoslavia, which has been known by that name since June 1920, actually was founded in April 1919 as the Socialist Labor Party. On that date, in a move taken as a natural sequel to the formation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, the Croats, and the Slovenes in the preceding year, the Social Democratic parties of Serbia, Croatia, Slavonia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Slovenia merged.

One of the new party's constituent parts, the Serb Social Democratic Party, had its start in the socialist movement of the seventies. Because there was no considerable Serbian industrial proletariat, and because, in a primitive country still laboring under the disadvantages of long Turkish occupation, there was little basis for a left wing movement, the movement made no marked progress until the turn of the century. Socialist activity was confined to the publication of pamphlets, newspapers, and leaflets, and the holding of political meetings. It was not until the summer of 1903 that the Serbian Social Democratic Party itself was founded at a congress which also organized the General Confederation of Labor. The Serb Social Democratic Party from the beginning stressed the principle of the class struggle, and, like the Bosnian party (founded in 1909), always belonged to the left wing of the Second International.

The Social Democratic parties of Slovenia, Croatia, and Voyvodina, on the other hand, were constituent parts of the Austrian and Hungarian parties. They therefore had a more moderate orientation than the Serb party. This difference in antecedents was later reflected in the factional strife with which the Yugoslav Socialist Labor Party and its successor, the Yugoslav Communist Party, were afflicted.

During the Balkan and World Wars, the Serb party, along with the Russian Bolsheviks and the Bulgarian Social Democrats, opposed the war effort, which they regarded as a manifestation of Tsarism and Western imperialism. Both in print and in Parliament the Serb Social Democrats expressed their opposition to the war and to war credits. To "emancipate the Balkan peninsula from imperialist influence" and to "assure the political progress of its peoples," the party advocated, as the Bulgarian Social Democrats had done earlier, a union of all Balkan peoples in a federation of republics. Such a proposal was made on 8 October 1915 by the Social Democratic deputies Katslerovich and Lapchevich.

The party, however, was not unanimous in its opposition to the war, nor did it adhere to a consistent Bolshevik line. It was accused by thoroughgoing communists of showing "centrist" -- i.e. moderate and revisionist -- tendencies. During the war the "centrists" took the position that the class struggle should be postponed for the duration and, for the sake of the unity of labor, were willing to associate with the so-called "socialist chauvinists" or "socialist patriots," who actively supported their respective national causes.

Stimulated by the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, the South Slav Social Democratic parties veered toward the left.

The resolutions adopted by the conference of the Croatian and Slavonian Social Democratic Party in Zagreb (25-26 January 1919) for example, felicitated Soviet Russia and expressed approval of the revolutionary movement in Germany, Austria-Hungary, and other countries. The South Slav parties also refused to attend the Bern Conference of the Second International (February 1919). After they had been united in the Socialist Labor Party, they set forth their reasons for declining the invitation, in a letter to the Executive Committee of the First Congress of the Communist International (January 1919): "We want nothing in common with the socialist traitors; we take the communist point of view. The better part of the workers in Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, and Slavonia, are convinced that the path to true socialism leads through the dictatorship of the proletariat as expressed in the power of the Soviets."

The congress of Belgrade, (or First Congress, as the Yugoslav communists call it), at which the South-Slav Social Democratic parties merged and formed the Socialist Labor Party, met in April 1919, one month after the foundation of the Third (Communist) International in Moscow. In spite of police measures and the alleged intrigues of the so-called socialist patriots, all of the social democratic groups of the new kingdom except some Mensheviks were represented. The congress, dominated by the left wing, came out against "ministerialism" -- i.e., participation of party members in "bourgeois" cabinets -- expelled the Socialist Patriots, and aligned itself with the Third International and its emphasis on the class struggle.

Government repression followed. Many of the delegates who had attended were arrested and beaten, and most of the local units in Bosnia and the Voyvodina were closed. Moreover, the party was beset by internal dissension. When the Second Congress met in Vukovar, 20-25 June 1920, the right and center factions joined forces against the left; but the convention changed the party's name to Communist Party and ended with the election of a left leadership, and the adoption of resolutions showing a left slant. Shortly thereafter, the center, led by Zhivko Topalovich and Yakschich, drew even closer to the right faction led by Lapchevich. These two factions jointly published a manifesto against the left group, whereupon the left faction met and expelled them. In 1921 the expelled factions joined with other moderate socialist groups -- such as the "ministerialists," who had not adhered to the Socialist Labor Party, to form a new Social Democratic Party. Its membership remained small (for example, it won only two seats in Parliament in the election of 1927) and consisted primarily of functionaries of trade unions and other labor organizations. The publications of this party, and the activities of the "reformist" trade unions associated with it, were not proscribed even by the extreme right wing Premiers of the Royal Dictatorships, such as Zhivkovich and Stoyadinovich. The leaders of this Social Democratic party often accepted appointments as members of commissions and as delegates to international labor congresses -- appointments which apparently were tendered by the authoritarian Yugoslav governments in an effort to create abroad the impression that their labor policies were liberal. Prominent among the Social Democrats was Zhivko Topalovich, former leader of the center faction of the Socialist Labor Party.[1]

In spite of the government repression that followed the congress of Belgrade and the schism that occurred after the Congress of Vukovar, the Communist Party, which at that time numbered only 70,000 members, won municipal elections in Belgrade, Zagreb, Nish, Osiyek, and Valyevo. In the general election of November 1920 -- the freest election since the formation of the united kingdom -- the party's candidates polled approximately 200,000 votes, capturing 58 (the communists claim 59) of the 419 seats, thus becoming the third strongest party in the assembly.

---

[1] Topalovich was elected president of General Mihailovich's National Congress, held at Ravna Gora on 26-28 January 1944, and even more recently (June 1944) has been representing Mihailovich in conversations with Premier Subasich at Bari.

The unusual nature of the communist movement in Yugoslavia is revealed by the fact that the Communist Party, which derived its support from areas geographically more widely distributed than any other party except the Radicals, did not find its main strength in urban industrial districts, but in the backward areas peopled by small peasants and herdsmen. For example, industrialized Slovenia gave the Communist Party only four seats while Montenegro cast the largest proportional vote for the party. Yugoslav communist strength has never resided in an industrial proletariat acting in accord with theoretical Marxist precepts, but among illiterate, landhungry peasants who could not possibly have recognized a Marxist principle if it had been expounded to them.

The party's influence on non-communist elements was also shown by the demonstrations of protest against foreign intervention in Soviet Russia and Soviet Hungary which took place in 1920 in Belgrade, Nish, and Zagreb. The communists also claimed credit for the railroad strike, the general miners' strike of 1920, and the Croatian peasant uprising in the fall of 1920.

The party's strength alarmed the government, which countered with repressive measures. Using the miners' strike as a pretext, it issued a decree on 29 November 1920 dissolving all communist organizations and closing their press. Thereafter some members of the party lost faith in the efficacy of political activity, and resorted to individual acts of terror. On 28 June 1921 an attempt was made on the life of Alexander, then Prince Regent; and the following month Drashkovich, the Minister of the Interior and author of the decree of dissolution, was killed by a young Bosnian communist.[1] Communists have since attributed this lapse from sanctioned Marxist tactics to the then generally "incorrect" orientation of the South Slav Communist Party.

In response to these terroristic acts the government in August 1921 carried through Parliament a drastic law for "the security of the state." This law not only outlawed the Communist Party and denied its members the right to hold office, but also prohibited all communist or anarchist agitation and subversive propaganda, on pain of death or imprisonment at hard labor. The law prohibited strikes by public employees, and authorized the government to dissolve other trade unions transgressing the legal limitations on their activity. Finally, for the more efficient enforcement of these provisions, a military contingent was added to the national police force.

Thereafter the Communist Party led a precarious illegal existence. Although it did not cease to exist, it became even more ineffectual than it had been during its short legal existence. It was unprepared for underground activity and did not at once establish a network of illegal organizations. Moreover, it continued to be rent by factionalism to such an extent that, even when it had leaders who were not altogether doctrinaire and unrealistic, they were unable to make their views prevail. Apparently because of its failure to pursue policies designed to meet the existing political situation, the party had lost ground even before it was made illegal.

---

[1] It is of interest to note that Drashkovich's son is now a leader of Mihailovich's youth movement.

Thereafter, though attempts were made to adapt its program to local circumstances, the scope of its activity was so limited by the repressive measures of the government that it was unable to recover lost ground.

From 1921 on, strenuous efforts were made by certain Yugoslav communists and by the Third International to unify the Yugoslav Communist Party and to re-orient it on two major issues. The first of these was the national question. When the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was formed, the Communist Party favored unification, and opposed autonomy for the component ethnic units. Although this position coincided with the contemporary tendency of theoretical Marxism to ignore nationality as a basis for political subdivision, it also coincided with the wishes of the Serb ruling group. While the Croats, Slovenians, Montenegrins, and Macedonians became restive under Serb hegemony, the Communist Party stood in part committed to the unification under Belgrade.

The right wing of the party led by S. Markovich, continued to look upon this conflict between Centralism and Federalism as merely a phase of the competition among rival bourgeois groups, and felt that the party should continue to concentrate on the class struggle and not become enmeshed in "bourgeois-nationalistic" politics. On this question the right could count on the support of the Serb party members -- who on other issues were to be found on the left -- for they were influenced by the "Great Serb" ideology which affected Serb labor and Serbs in general. The Left which was in favor of giving the several national groups of Yugoslavia the right of self-determination, never succeeded in getting its position accepted by the party as a whole.

The second major issue was the agrarian question. The right faction ignored the potential role of the peasantry in the revolutionary struggle, looking upon the peasant movement, as crystallized, for instance, in Radich's and Machek's Croatian peasant party, as a "bourgeois" phenomenon. The right preferred to have the proletariat play a lone revolutionary role, and effectively prevented the party as a whole from forming a united front with the Croatian Peasant Party.

The first party conference, which met abroad in 1922, elected a provisional leadership in which the following of Markovich had a majority. The second party conference, in 1923, also meeting abroad, was preoccupied with intra-party strife, but this time elected a leftist leadership. These leaders met in Belgrade in January 1923 and organized a legal front for the Communist Party, now giving it the name Independent Labor Party, and providing it with a platform designed to get around the provisions of the law barring the Communist Party. The new party also was dissolved by the government in July 1924, but, while in existence, it published several newspapers, in which it campaigned for the election of 1923. It even put up candidates in fifteen of the fifty-four election districts.

The Independent Labor Party also conducted discussions and a referendum of party members on the national and agrarian questions, in preparation for the third conference which met on 25-26 November 1924, this time in Belgrade. This conference was dominated by the left, and on the national question -- following the recommendations of the Fifth Congress of the Communist International (1924) -- it repudiated the position of the rightist faction led by Markovich. It adopted a plank favoring Croatian, Slovenian, Macedonian, and Montenegrin independence, and urging the formation of a Balkan federation of equal and independent worker-peasant republics. After the conference, the left leadership was unable to win any wide party acceptance for these views on the national question, but its program differs only in its language from that now put forward by the Partisans.

At the same conference the party experienced a crisis over the peasant question. Being dominated by the left, and having been prodded by Stalin and Zinoviev, the conference adopted a plank favoring the confiscation of landed estates. When the conference decided to join forces with Radich's Croatian Peasant Republican Party in a united front, the rightist faction opposed the move, taking the position that the Communist Party should collaborate only with a peasant party or movement that would stand squarely on an anti-capitalist platform. One faction of the rightist opposition actually left the party on this occasion, and the party itself expelled a leader named Milaykovich because of his uncompromising opposition to collaboration with the Peasant Party. Milaykovich had engaged in polemics with the left leadership at the time of the 1923 campaign, when the party came out in favor of a worker-peasant bloc, and had objected when it attempted to popularize the idea of a united front of workers and peasants. This idea had been propounded by the Moscow-sponsored but short-lived "Peasant International," which Radich, the Croat Peasant Party Leader had joined on his trip to Moscow in the early twenties.

The main support of the rightist faction came from the Red Trade Unions. Their organ, the Organizovani Radnik took up the fight against the stand of the left on both of the above issues during the controversy which preceded the Belgrade conference. Therefore the Executive Committee of the Communist Party initiated and carried through the conference a resolution affecting the relationship between the party and the trade unions. It was decided to organize party cells in the trade unions for the purpose of assuming the ideological and political leadership of the unions and of counteracting their rightist social democratic tendencies.

When the Third Congress (as distinguished from conference) met abroad in June 1926, a serious effort was made by both factions to compose their differences. Even Markovich admitted the error of his "social democratic" ways. All decisions were unanimously arrived at and the Executive Committee which was elected represented both the right and left as well as neutral elements.

Factional strife, nevertheless, continued unabated until the Executive Committee of the Third International itself took a hand in the matter. In an "open letter" it called attention to the bankruptcy of the leadership of intellectuals and laid down the party line to be followed in the future. Specifically, it instructed the party to fight for the right of national groups to self-determination, and to strengthen its position in the rural areas. At the same time the leadership was deposed and a new provisional leadership, composed primarily of workers, appointed. This new non-factional organization conducted a discussion on the subject of this "open letter" in preparation for the Fourth Congress which was to meet at the end of 1928. This Congress, when it met, succeeded in establishing party unity.

On 6 January 1929, however, King Alexander assumed dictatorial powers, dissolved Parliament, and banned all political parties. The active leaders of the Communist Party either were imprisoned or fled to Moscow. Although the party was thus disabled, many individual Communists remained active in factory cells, keeping alive opposition to the regime.

Throughout the thirties the party was hampered even in its underground activities by the existence of a strong police control and the establishment of concentration camps for political offenders. It has been estimated that the party lost 10 percent of its membership to the police annually. After 1929, in any event, it was very weak. Nevertheless, it had a good many sympathizers, some of whom were university students or junior public officials. Some joined the party, but the majority only expressed their opposition to the dictatorship, an opposition which might well have broken out into an open revolt had it not been for the threat of war.

After 1935, when the Communist International sponsored the united front movement, the Yugoslav communists are reported to have made advances to the Social Democrats and trade union leaders with a view toward joining forces, but apparently without success.

The platform of the party during this period was an amplification of the two planks adopted by the conference of 1928 at the instigation of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. Supporting the Croat-Serb opposition, the party favored the introduction of free and secret elections, and the solution of the national problem on the basis of the right of self-determination. At the same time, the party was opposed to the dismemberment of Yugoslavia, favoring instead a Yugoslav democratic federal state. There is a striking parallel between this program and that of the Partisans. In 1939 a Russian source, in commenting upon this program of the Yugoslav Communist Party, observed that the united forces of the workers, peasants, and oppressed national groups would constitute the greatest obstacle to the penetration of Yugoslavia by Nazism.

C. Communism in Partisan Yugoslavia

The Yugoslav Partisan Movement has often been identified as communist, and all its members as communists. The Yugoslav Communist Party did indeed take the initial steps in organizing the movement; communists had had valuable experience in organizing underground activities, and some had studied in Russian staff schools or fought in Spain. But as the movement grew, making willingness to fight the Germans its only condition of membership, it became a coalition of Yugoslav political parties ranging from the center to the left, including democrats, liberals, and agrarians, as well as communists.

In Serbia, the Communist Party, the left wing of the Democratic Party led by Dr. Ivan Ribar, the left wing of the Agrarian Party led by Dragolyub Yovanovich and segments of other parties, representing, in the main, intellectuals and peasants, have taken part in the National Liberation Movement from the beginning. In Croatia, in addition to the Communist Party, nearly all of the leaders of the Independent Democratic Party (made up of Serbs domiciled in Croatia) and their following joined the Movement at the start. Many members of the dominant Croat Peasant Party also have joined, and are continuing to join, apparently against the will of their leader, Machek. A new leadership has emerged from their ranks, and the party maintains its own organization within the Partisan movement. In Slovenia, on the initiative of the Communist Party, several parties and political organizations formed a united front a few weeks after the German invasion; and now the Liberation movement includes representatives of all groups except the clericals, who continue to oppose it.

All Yugoslav religious groups -- Orthodox, Roman

Catholic, and Moslem -- are represented in the National Liberation movement, and so are all ethnic groups: Serbs from Serbia proper, Orthodox and Moslem Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, and even Albanians. The composition of the National Liberation Army probably gives a general indication of their relative proportions, although it consists in part of conscripts. According to Tito's own account, the army is 40 percent Serb, 30 percent Croat, 10 percent Slovene, 5 percent Montenegrin, 2½ percent Macedonian, and 6 percent of other nationalities, not counting the Italian units. Two and one-half percent of the army are Moslems. Most of the members of the army are peasants. According to Allied observers who have been in and out of Partisan territory, and who have had an opportunity to study the political complexion and activities of the Partisan Movement, the communist leaders among the Partisans are aware of the limitations of communism for Yugoslavia, a country of smallholders, and realize that, in order to achieve lasting success, the movement must maintain a broader popular base than communism can offer. The communists themselves remain prominent in the movement, but they do not control it.

An examination of the personnel of the executive and administrative branches of the "Provisional Government" illustrates this point. Of the five vice-presidents of the Presidium of the Anti-Fascist Council, two, Dimitriye Vlahov and the late Mosha Piyade, are communists; while the president, Ivan Ribar, is a prominent member of the Serb Democratic Party. The five vice-presidents seem to have been chosen not because of their political affiliations, but in order to implement the federal principle which underlies partisan political planning for the future: there is one vice-president for every one of the units of the projected Yugoslav federation, including Macedonia. In this respect, as well as in the establishment of the Presidium as such, the Partisans appear to have been influenced by the governmental structure of the USSR.

Among the eleven members of the National Committee of Liberation -- the Cabinet of the "Provisional Government" -- there are only two communists, including Tito, who is Chairman of the Committee and Chief of National Defense. Two are members of the Croat Peasant Party; four are members of democratic parties (Serb and Croat); one is a Slovene clerical, one a Moslem, and one an Orthodox priest. In the organization of this cabinet an attempt to give representation to ethnic units is again noticeable: there are vice-chairmen for Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia. These positions are held respectively by Vladislav Ribnikar, a liberal Serb democrat of Slovene origin, formerly editor of the chief Belgrade newspaper, Politika; Bozhidar Magovats, prominent member of the Croat Peasant Party, and former editor of its official newspaper, Dom; and Eduard Kardely, secretary of the Executive Committee of the Communist Party in Slovenia.

In the army there are a number of officers and technical men trained in the Russian Staff School, some of whom had practical experience with the International Brigade during the Spanish Civil War. To this group belong Tito himself and six of his ten corps commanders. Many of the highest posts, however, have been assigned to normally conservative Serbian army officers, some of whom have come over from Mihailovich.

The National Army of Liberation has taken over from the Russians the institution of political commissars. These men, who have been trained militarily as well as politically, have the task of maintaining the morale of the troops and of giving them cultural and political instruction. They are also in charge of security and propaganda, and are very largely responsible for recruiting. In the larger units they do intelligence work, developing courier lines and subversive organizations. Finally, they are the liaison with the Communist Party. In Slovenia, for example, great importance is attached to the Agitprop, the department of the General Staff to which the Political Commissars belong.

In addition to these institutional forms and devices, the Partisans have also borrowed certain Soviet and communist symbols. The rank and file of the Partisans wear a red star on their cap; they paint the hammer and sickle insignia on the walls of their headquarters; they give the clenched fist salute (including the priests among them); Stalin's picture is everywhere to be seen along with Tito's. In spite of this adoption of external symbolism, however, there appears to be only an infinitesimal proportion of doctrinaire Marxists in the Partisan ranks. Even when the Partisans actually call themselves communists, observers report that they are usually not members of the Communist Party or communists by any normal definition of the word.

They are opposed to the restoration of the Yugoslav authoritarian regime; they are eager to see an end to the Serb-Croat feud; they admire and respect Russia, as Yugoslav peasants have always admired Russia, no matter what the nature of the Russian regime. Although this feeling has in the past been less marked among the Roman Catholic Croats and Slovenes than among the Orthodox Serbs, who have the additional bond of religion, the Red Army's victories over the Germans have now created almost universal pro-Russian sentiment. When this is combined with a strong wish for political reform, and the adoption of the external symbolism of Russian communism, it is easy to mistake it for the genuine article.

The Communist Party is now playing a largely conservative role; its revolutionary objectives are apparently limited, and it urges that after Yugoslavia is liberated the people should be given the opportunity to select their own form of government. It is probably true that after liberation the Party will be stronger than at any time in its history, chiefly because it has played a major role in organizing the resistance movement, and has apparently dropped its former narrowly communist political aims, and adopted a broadly national program, which does not conflict with the views of the majority of Yugoslavs. It has never adopted an anti-religious attitude: Orthodox and Roman Catholic priests and Moslem imans are attached to the armed forces as chaplains, and freedom of religious worship is guaranteed in areas liberated from the Germans.

Tito's representative in the Middle East, and more recently in London, Major General Velebit, who has been a member of the Communist Party since 1935, says that the Party does not favor the establishment in Yugoslavia of a one-party state modeled on the Soviet Union. According to the practice within the Partisan movement, all political parties will be allowed to express their own political views, no matter how hostile to the Communist Party. Collectivizing of land on the Soviet pattern, Velebit believes, would be against the wishes of the peasants, who own their own land; and the Communist Party has no intention of going against the wishes of the peasants, who make up 80 percent of the total population of Yugoslavia. Velebit also asserts that the policy of the National Liberation Movement is not to abolish the institution of private property or to place means of production under state control. On the contrary, he says, because Yugoslavia has never been industrialized, encouragement will be given to those who take the initiative in carrying out a program of industrialization. Profits will not be abolished, but will be controlled by taxation, minimum wage laws, etc. Thus, it appears that the Yugoslav communists do not favor a social and economic revolution like that of the Bolsheviks in Russia. Whatever those communists within the Partisan leadership may intend, they now appear aware that they will have to compromise with three powerful factors: nationalism, religion, and the desire for private property.

The "bill of rights" promulgated by the Regional Anti-Fascists Council of Croatia on 8 May 1944, for example, could not have been adopted by any Partisan agency without communist participation and approval. This document would seem to prove that the communists, if not enthusiastic about the ingrained strength of these popular sentiments, are at least willing to give them their due. The declaration guarantees to all citizens of Croatia not only equality before the law, and freedom of speech, press, assembly, and religion, universal suffrage, and the secret ballot, but also the rights of private ownership and private initiative and the right of national minorities to free national existence within the state of Croatia. The same program is favored for the other regions of the country.

There is no apparent reason to believe that the political practices and political program outlined above are not the genuine practices and program of the Partisans, or to suspect that behind a front apparently democratic and liberal a revolution on the Russian model is being prepared. There is no government against which to revolt (unless a Great-Serb regime should attempt to return), and no section of population eager to revolt. Yugoslavia has neither landless peasantry nor an exploited urban proletariat; when the Germans have been expelled, it may prove possible for a country of small peasant proprietors to institute peacefully the kind of agrarian democracy which the Partisans apparently have in mind -- a society politically based on autonomy for the nationalities within a federal state, economically based upon peasant cooperatives, and internationally oriented toward friendship and eventual federation with the other Balkan states, and toward close relations with Russia.

III. GREECE

A. Introduction

Two strands varying in strength with time and circumstance have served to connect Greece with Russia: religion and social doctrine. Russia has been variously the patron of the Greek Orthodox Church and of the Communist Party. And from a more practical viewpoint, Russia has recognized the political value of Greek sympathy. Early in the eighteenth century she perceived the potential usefulness of Greece in her struggle with Turkey. Many Greeks entered Russian service and rose to positions of great influence in that country. In 1770 Gregory Orlov formed a project for establishing an independent principality in Greece, and a Russian fleet was sent to the Aegean. The people of the Peloponnesus thought deliverance from the Turks was at hand, and rose in revolt; but they were cruelly suppressed, chiefly by Albanian mercenaries.

Agitation for the liberation of Greece centered in the literary and political societies called Eterie, which sprang up in every Greek community. Of these the most influential and the best known was the Filiki Eteria at Odessa, which by 1820 had enrolled 200,000 members. It was this Eteria which instigated the revolution that ultimately resulted in the liberation of Greece. Along with England and France, Russia was one of the protective powers which exercised tutelage over Greece and helped select its rulers; but after the revolution her active interest lapsed.

Anticlericalism became noticeable in Greece at the end of the nineteenth century, but opposition was political and social rather than religious. Legislation beginning in 1909 ended the political power of the church, and in the twenties its landed holdings were expropriated.

Greek society was profoundly affected by the first World War and the crisis which followed. Partly as a consequence of the Russian revolution, the working class became more radical and militant, and demanded freedom of association, labor legislation, and higher wages. Peasants demanded expropriation of large estates. Artisans and small shopkeepers protested against inflationary prices and high taxes. There was a series of strikes between 1920 and 1924. In the Liberal Party a radical group was formed which demanded immediate establishment of a republic, expropriation of large estates, and adequate labor legislation.

A new element was introduced in 1920, when the Communist Party split off from the Confederation of Labor and proclaimed its adherence to the Third International. Until 1931 it was torn by dissension. In that year all dissident groups were expelled, and Zakhariadhis was elected leader; since then, no splits have occurred. In 1928 the membership of the Communist Party was less than 5,000, and in 1936 about 20,000. It elected nine deputies in 1926, ten in 1928 and 1932, fifteen in 1936.

After the election of 1936 the communists held the balance in the Chamber between the Venizelists and the Anti-Venizelists. In this impasse, Dhemerdzis formed a neutral government, and on his death was succeeded by Metaxas. Metaxas claimed that his program of reform would be hampered by ordinary parliamentary procedure, and set up a smaller committee in which each party was represented. Opposition and protest were aroused by Metaxas' high-handedness and his appointment of friends to high office. There were strikes in the spring of 1936; and when the unions announced they would call a general strike on 4 August, Metaxas forestalled them by setting up a dictatorship. Parliament was dissolved, opposition leaders were exiled or arrested, and the opposition parties virtually ceased to exist. The Communist Party went underground. As the most clearly defined and active nucleus of opposition, it won support among those who detested the Metaxas regime for its curtailment of liberty and its adoption of fascist techniques.

The Communist Party had a considerable following among the industrial workers, the landless agricultural laborers and smallholders, especially those producing such industrial crops as currants and tobacco, and the cereal-growing farmers in the North. It also had some support in the poorer sections of the lower middle classes. It controlled one of the largest of the four Labor Confederations, the Enotiki Yeniki Sinomospondia (General Unifying Federation), and its newspaper Rizospastis (The Radical) had a circulation of about 15,000.

B. The EAM

By the time of the German invasion in April 1941 the Communist Party had recovered from the disorganization incident on the Metaxas coup; it elected a new central committee under George Santos, the present secretary of the Party, and carried out a thorough reorganization. Its long experience in underground activity rendered adjustment to the new conditions easy; and though communists, even with the increase in numbers after the occupation, can comprise only a small proportion of the population, they nevertheless succeeded in fathering the first organized movement in Greece for resistance to the occupying powers.

This was the Ethnikon Apeleftherotikon Metopon, or National Liberation Front (the use of the word "front" is significant), commonly known as the EAM. The EAM has a central organization and branches all over Greece. Its central committee is under communist control, but the greater part of the EAM membership (variously estimated at from 75-92 percent) consists of non-communists. Besides the Communist Party it includes a number of Agrarian parties, the Socialist Party, the "Greek Popular Democracy" of Tsirimokos, a large body of intellectuals headed by Professor Svolos of the University of Athens, and many other groups too numerous to mention. It has organized demonstrations, sabotage, and resistance, and has published a host of underground papers, posters, and pamphlets. During the fall of 1942 and afterwards, EAM (along with other resistance groups) rendered particularly useful service to the Allies by obstructing Axis transport through Greece, which was a principal route for manpower and supplies for the North African campaign. Of such acts, an outstanding example was the destruction of the Gorgopotamos bridge in November 1942. In addition, the EAM instigated impressive protest demonstrations. Resolute but well-disciplined crowds numbering as many as 150,000 filled the squares of Athens and Piraeus in March, June, August, and October of 1943 to protest abuses of the occupying authorities.

C. Communism in the EAM: Various Views

To gauge the role of communist doctrine in the resistance movements is extremely difficult. The sources dealing with this subject are vague, biased, and contradictory. It is obviously an oversimplification, assiduously fostered by the Germans, to characterize all resistance as communist, just as it is an oversimplification to characterize all opponents of EAM as fascists and collaborators. Conservatives in the Balkans have been quick to dub the adherents of even moderate programs of reform as communists. In addition, questions of military and political expediency enter, and the EAM has been praised as patriotic or castigated as communist on grounds other than its own political tenets.

Even the stories told by escapees cannot represent the whole situation fairly: for the EAM has not encouraged its own sympathizers to leave Greece, and escapees are apt to be hostile to the EAM. On the other hand, a consensus among persons deriving from various walks of life, social positions, and localities must carry some weight. From a study of various charges laid against the EAM by such persons one observer claims that they constitute the pattern laid down for revolutionary procedure in communist scriptures.

The charges are: (1) that the EAM calumniates the leaders of possible rival organizations. Widely circulated pamphlets of the EAM call leaders of the EDES and other rival organizations "traitors" and "instruments of the Gestapo"; (2) that the EAM, at various periods in its career, has been as intent on annihilating rival bands as on fighting the Germans; (3) that by making minor attacks and committing sabotage in quiet districts the EAM deliberately provokes German reprisals, so that its own ranks may be swelled by the angry and the homeless; (4) that the EAM's intention is to sovietize the country so as to present the Allies with a fait accompli; (5) that its policy is to cajole or coerce the people into an appearance of unity, and to reveal its communist aims only gradually. After setting forth these allegations of escapees, the observer in question traces each to its origin in communist precedent or doctrine. The controlling motive of the left-wing groups, he argues, is to seize political control, by the use of whatever force, subterfuge, or deception may advance their cause.

Of the alleged procedures some appear to grow naturally out of the circumstances and would probably be followed if neither Marx nor Russia had ever existed. Nevertheless, it is very likely that the direction of the EAM has been in the hands of men schooled in communist doctrine who have consciously followed a prescribed revolutionary technique.

This does not necessarily mean, however, that the EAM is completely dominated by communists and communist principles. According to an official EAM estimate, which seems to be confirmed by a number of disinterested sources, communists constitute no more than 15 percent, and probably less than 8 percent, of the total membership. General Sarafis, commander-in-chief of the EAM's guerrilla forces (ELAS), is not a communist; and there is only one communist (George Santos, Secretary of the Communist Party) among the ten members of the EAM's Political Committee (PEEA).

Official spokesmen of the EAM insist that their only ideological premises and purposes are democratic and national. They deny that the EAM seeks to sovietize Greece, and aver that their goal is threefold: (a) to keep Greeks in Greece alive, in order to combat the enemy now and to be of service when the Allies enter Greece; (b) to achieve the liberation of Greece and drive out the Germans and the Bulgarians; and (c) to set up a Greek government after the liberation which will express the real will of the people. In this connection, they insist, it is vital that the King remain outside of Greece until after a plebiscite. This is especially important, they believe, in order to assure a fair election and prevent a repetition of the plebiscite of 1935, which showed that more than 107 percent [sic] of the electorate was in favor of the restoration of the King. They declare that, while the EAM has no ambition for territorial aggrandizement and would be content with the 1939 boundaries, it would welcome the annexation of such Greek-speaking areas as the

Dodecanese, Northern Epirus (Southern Albania), and Cyprus, if the inhabitants of these areas so desire.

Even opponents of the EAM express the belief that the EAM is not predominantly communist, although they feel that its effectiveness is impaired by the preference shown to accredite party members. While this may often be true, it is of some interest to note that the president of the Board of Governors of the Bank of Greece, himself blacklisted by the EAM, wrote to the German administrator, Neubacher, at the end of November 1943:

> "The EAM is not an organ of London or Moscow, neither is it a secret organization.... In my opinion the EAM is a symbolic expression of protest, purely Greek, and is the most characteristic expression of our two and a half years of oppression. Unending privations and despair have driven our people to the thought of a communist paradise; but the Greek, a merchant by nature and highly individualistic, has no instinctive sympathy for communism...."

Similar views have been expressed by John Politis, Greek Minister to Italy at the outbreak of the war, who was until recently Greek representative in the Allied Advisory Council on Mediterranean Affairs:

> "Communism, as a slogan, has acquired new followers in considerable numbers since the enemy occupation. It is difficult, however, to recognize the features of a conscious communism. Communism in Greece is rather a rallying point for all the discontented, whose number constantly increases because of the severe ordeals through which the country is going. One must keep in mind that 87 percent of the Greek population are farmers and that the agrarian reforms introduced more than twenty years ago have been almost competely realized, and have provided each one of these farmers with a portion of land which he owns entirely. It is difficult to imagine that Greek farmers would prefer to become salaried farm laborers by voting for a regime which would nationalize the means of production and hence also the land."

Of considerable significance in this connection is a recent statement (2 August) by Premier Papandreou, who has never made any effort to conceal his hostility to the EAM. Speaking on his own initiative to a group of American officers whom he had invited for this purpose, he declared that ideologically the EAM and the Cairo Cabinet are separated by very little, that the difference between them is methodological. The EAM, he said, wants to retain its class army in order to impose what it calls "democratic socialism"; it would have the army serve the interests of only a single group. Papandreou, on the other hand, maintains that the army, which belongs to the whole nation, should serve as the instrument of the will of the entire people. For this reason, he believes, the American people err in looking upon the Cairo Government as the reactionary old guard. It is the EAM which is truly reactionary, because it resorts to force, while the orderly means employed by the Government are the "new expression of the inevitable social democracy for all the nations of this world." Despite his apparent moderation on this occasion with regard to the EAM, Papandreou does not conceal his hostility to the USSR, and warns that the U.S. must interest itself more directly in Balkan affairs, which in his opinion prefigure what he terms "the coming struggle between the Anglo-Saxons and Pan-Slavism."

American witnesses disagree in their estimate of the extent and importance of the communist influence in Greece. One American officer, who spent several months in Greece, has a very low opinion of the character, political program, and military effectiveness of the EAM-ELAS. He dislikes the leaders of the organization, and reports that the organization is far less popular with the common people than is generally realized. He is convinced that the Communists are aiming at a dictatorship, and are husbanding arms and ammunition against the day when they will be able to make use of them to seize control of Greece by force.

Other Americans, who have had equal opportunities for observation in Greece, hold a contrary view. They believe that the EAM has no totalitarian ambitions and seeks only the establishment of a democratic government. The communists in the organization, according to this school of thought, are aware that the Greeks are antipathetic to Marxist ideology in general, and realize that the strength and wide popular following of the EAM represent support, not for communism, but for resistance to the Germans and Bulgarians. Once Greece is liberated, it is believed, many, if not most, of those who now call themselves communists will find the label invidious and will depart from the fold. The ideological communists, it is said, recognize this, and are content to exert their influence to secure the adoption of a progressive program of political and economic reform.

D. Hostilities between the EAM and Its Rivals

In the face of so much difference of opinion, it is not easy to determine whether or not the conflicts between the EAM and its rivals have had an ideological basis. According to one view, ELAS attacks upon its rivals, the EDES and EKKA, represent an attempt by the Communists to wipe out all opposition, so that, when the Germans withdraw, they may have full control of Greece politically and militarily, and may then be in a position to set up a proletarian dictatorship without difficulty. This interpretation is prevalent among many opponents of the EAM, who point out that for a time at least, each ELAS guerrilla band had a political commissar, who could, and often did, veto or modify the orders issued by the actual military commander.

Other students of Greek affairs point out that the clashes between the ELAS guerrillas and rival forces have rarely amounted to more than an occasional skirmish between small groups of men. EAM apologists contend that these hostilities, which lasted from October 1943 until the truce of 29 February 1944, were provoked with foreign encouragement by the EDES, which it accuses of initiating the hostilities and of collaborating with the quisling Security Battalions and with the Germans. When it was proved that the Athenian sections of the EDES had cooperated with the Germans, General Zervas dissociated himself from the groups which had been guilty of collusion, and reorganized his forces in the mountains of Epirus.

The EAM is especially bitter against the quisling-led, German-equipped Security Battalions. These forces, which have dedicated themselves to the task of purging Greece of "communism," take action exclusively against the ELAS. Although many Greeks in these quisling units have been led to believe that they are performing a national service in "helping to preserve order," the Security Battalions are in point of fact operating under German orders, and are helping to relieve the German shortage of manpower. The EAM charges that Papandreou refuses to condemn the members of the Security Battalions as collaborationists because he himself is in treasonable contact with them and with the quisling premier Rallis.

In April, during the course of negotiations for the expansion of the Cairo government, the EAM, charging that its rivals had encroached upon its domains and had collaborated with the Germans and the quisling government, launched a series of attacks upon both the EDES and the EKKA. As a result of this campaign Col. Psarros, commander of the EKKA, was killed (17 April) by ELAS forces led by Ares Velouchiotes, a communist who wields considerable power in the organization. These clashes may or may not indicate that the communists in the EAM are seeking an opportunity to set up a dictatorship. But they do show that the EAM is intolerant of opposition, and is determined to extend its control.

The British have been irritated by EAM tactics and have apparently either cut off, or greatly reduced, their shipments of supplies and munitions. The EAM claims that the British are still providing equipment for the EDES, and maintains that they are deliberately building up the EDES so as to weaken or liquidate the EAM. On this account much anti-British talk is reported among ELAS officers and men, and the Germans are taking advantage of this unfortunate situation to spread rumors of an impending Anglo-American peace and alliance with Germany against Russia.

Now that the EAM has consented to join Papandreou's Cabinet, however, there is some hope that a reconciliation between the EAM and the EDES can be effected. The German-controlled Athens radio is already heaping abuse upon Zervas, whom it had never attacked before, for allying himself for the EDES with the "communist" EAM. It is expected in some quarters that the Cairo Government will now condemn the Security Battalions, as the EAM has long been urging it to do. If Papandreou can be persuaded to do this, it is believed, most of the Security Battalions will join forces with the guerrilla organizations. This would relax the tension within Greece, and contribute greatly to national unity.

E. The Communist Program and the EAM's Government

Whether or not the communists in the organization are responsible for the aggressive tactics of the EAM, and for the clashes between the EAM and its rivals, it should be noted that the program of the Communist Party in Greece is not devoid of ideological implications.

The KKE (Communist Party of Greece) has outlined an ambitious program of education and social services, which could hardly be put into operation without strict governmental control of Greek industry. Socialism has not been stressed in recent months, during which the chief emphasis has been on liberal democracy, but there can be little doubt that the leaders of the Communist Party favor, and expect, the eventual socialization of Greek industry. It is not known to what extent these views are shared by the non-Communists in the EAM, although it is probable that socialist doctrine is now widespread. Even the conservative EDES calls for far-reaching social reforms, and looks forward to the establishment of what it calls the "Socialist Democracy of Greece."

Ostensibly, the difference between the EAM and the EDES in this regard does not seem great. All factions in Greece are confronted with a complete national breakdown. The poverty of Greece is so great, and the exhaustion of her resources so complete, that it is reasonable to assume that for a considerable period at least, free enterprise in its traditional, pre-war forms will be impossible. Until Greece is rehabilitated and recovers from the physical and economic devastation brought on by the war, the Greek economy will be unable to function without large governmental (i.e., Allied) subsidies.

Whether or not the communists in the EAM can, or mean, to exploit the opportunities presented by these circumstances to set up a system of state Socialism in Greece, it is clear that they are making every effort to dominate the political situation inside Greece. In the parts of Greece which are free from German control, the EAM has been functioning as a government. It has set up municipal administrative machinery in a large number of localities, supervises the administration of relief and the distribution of food, maintains order, and levies and collects taxes. On 10 March 1944 it formalized its administrative organization by establishing what it calls the Political Committee of National Liberation (PEEA-Politiki Epitropi Ethnikis Apeleftheroseos), which was to function as a kind of temporary government until the Cairo Cabinet could be reorganized to include representatives of the resistance movement.

The PEEA was apparently intended to exert pressure upon Premier Tsouderos to fulfil his promise to admit representatives of the underground to his cabinet. This question seems to have been settled, and the EAM and the communists have been provided with five positions in the cabinet of the new premier, Papandreou. But the EAM has given no sign that it plans to dissolve the PEEA, which is now acting as the executive branch of the EAM government in Greece, or to relinquish its hold on the Greek political situation. In April clandestine elections were held for the National Council, a legislative body which passes upon matters submitted to it by the PEEA. It is doubtful that these elections would have been held unless the PEEA had determined to continue in power for more than a brief period.

There is some evidence that Soviet models lie behind the system government the EAM has established, although there are numerous modifications and changes which are to be explained by local conditions. The use of the Soviet pattern is most clearly discernible in the scheme of local government. A former member of the EAM, reports that each town has a council composed of representatives of various classes. Thus, one town council consists of fifteen members, each of whom represents a different occupational class or group (manual workers, lawyers and doctors, government employees, bank employees, small traders, etc.). Each of these fifteen representatives, presumably elected by the workers or members of his class, presides over a committee of five (a so-called cell or pentad) chosen by himself. The village council is very similar, except that it usually contains only one or two classes. Each town or village council then delegates one member to serve on the Area Committee (of which there are thirty-nine, one for each nome, i.e., province or state.)

This organizational structure seems to be an adaptation of Soviet institutions of the period antecedent to the Constitutional reform of 1936. The PEEA itself and the National Council are in varying degree indigenous products, although points of resemblance to roughly similar Soviet counterparts are not lacking.

American observers who witnessed the April 1944 elections in the Karpenisi district and in Evvia report that the voting was secret and honestly conducted. Suffrage was universal for men and women over eighteen, and more than three hundred thousand votes were polled in Athens and the Piraeus. The voters cast their ballots for electors, who then met to choose the national councillors for each district. According to these witnesses, the electoral procedure resulted in the selection of competent councillors. Among them were two bishops, two priests, five university professors, eight generals, twenty government workers, five industrialists, fifteen doctors, twenty-five lawyers, twenty-two laborers, twenty-three farmers, ten newspaper men, ten scientists, and nine high school teachers.

Despite what anti-EAM authorities describe as widespread disillusionment with the EAM because of its "communistic terrorism, its overweening ambition, and its readiness to betray national interests," reports on these elections seem to indicate that the EAM has lost little, if any, of its popularity. According to seemingly unprejudiced sources, the EAM is most popular in Evvia and in other areas in which the guerrillas have not been very active. The organization is less popular in the Peloponnesus, the stronghold of Greek conservatism, and in the mountainous regions of central Greece, which have been the chief guerrilla haunts. Here, the local population has had to meet constant demands of the guerrilla commissariat, which has often requisitioned supplies by force and violence. Even in these areas however, it is said, that the people support the EAM, especially after they have had a taste of German occupation. They are most inclined to complain about the harshness of the EAM, if they have had little or no contact with the Germans and the quislings.

In the Karpenisi area and in Evvia, at any rate, the EAM is clearly the majority party. Former Premier Tsouderos, who opposed the EAM strenuously during his leadership of the Cairo Government, denies that the EAM supporters constitute a majority, but holds that the organization wields considerable political power because of its popularity among young people and intellectuals. American intelligence officers report that the EAM has won considerable support because of its agricultural program and its efficient administration of local government and of the courts. The lower clergy is strongly pro-EAM, and many priests fight side by side with the andartes (guerrilla warriors). It is generally held that the younger clergy favor the EAM, while the older men are either neutral or hostile. Even men like the bishops of Kozane and Pyrgos, however, are enthusiastic EAMites; and Damaskinos, Archbishop of Athens, who has been arrested by the Germans, is said to be well-disposed. Although in some villages EAM electioneering methods produced a false impression of unanimity, it is reported, the results actually represented the will of the majority.

The communist candidates polled a heavy vote, but many communists and EAMites failed of election. In the area in question, the communists, by disclaiming any intention to nationalize private property, abolish the church, or seize power by violence, have managed to overcome much of the Greek antipathy to the communist label. Even small landholders and others who would normally be regarded as the mainstay of conservatism look to the EAM for the maintenance of orderly institutions. Here again, however, it seems clear, the communists received support, not qua communists, but as men of experience who had fought the Germans and could be relied upon to continue the struggle.

F. EAM Affiliates and Sympathizers outside Greece

The EAM is strongly supported by a number of anti-fascist organizations in the Middle East. Perhaps the most important of these are to be found in the armed forces. There is a separate branch for the Army, Navy, and Air Corps. These organizations are run by central committees, which issue directives, receive dues, and put out publications. District and local committees carry out the directives of the central committees, collect the dues, and distribute publications. An analysis of the contents of specimen numbers of these publications indicates a certain sympathy towards communism, but an avoidance of specifically communist doctrine. Their program is to create and indoctrinate Greek fighting units, to liberate Greece, and to take care that the form of government in post-war Greece shall be freely determined by the people. Their special object is to combat the influence of conservative officers whom they suspect of royalist or Metaxist leanings. Representatives of the EAM and other underground movements are reported to have come to the Middle East for the purpose of spreading their respective political views among the Greek forces.

The Greek Seamen's Union at Alexandria has nine hundred members unemployed because of heavy sinkings of Greek ships. These men have strong communist leanings and are said to have drawn up a list of persons they consider fascist, some in the armed forces or in British employ, whom they propose to "liquidate" after Greece has been freed. EAM's communist sympathizers in Egypt are reported to be organized in a foreign branch called EAS; and a number of groups, like the Committee for the Coordination of the Struggle, ostensibly non-partisan, are sympathetic to the EAM. The New York and London Committees on Greek Unity are also favorably disposed to the EAM.

G. The April Mutinies

EAM sympathizers in the armed forces took an active part in organizing and leading the mutinies of April 1944, which forced Premier Tsouderos to resign and which eventually led to the formation of the Cabinet headed by Papandreou, the present premier. The precise role of the communists in these mutinies has yet to be determined. On the one hand, the mutineers, like the EAM, demanded an immediate reorganization of the Government in exile that would provide representation for the Greek underground. The mutineers made it clear that they were chiefly concerned that the EAM itself be represented in the Government, and that the Cairo Cabinet cooperate with the EAM's Political Committee (PEEA). To many observers this seemed sufficient evidence to prove that the EAM and the communists had instigated the mutiny.

On the other hand, when the communist and EAM delegates to the Lebanon Conference arrived at the scene of the Conference, they seemed to have had no prior knowledge of the mutinies, and joined their conservative colleagues in condemning the outbreaks. Moreover, the British charge Athanasios Bodosakis, a well-known munitions merchant, and

Byron Karapanayiotis, Minister of War in Tsouderos' Cabinet, with having financed and organized the mutinies. Counsel defending the mutineers even attempted to implicate Vice-Premier Sophocles Venizelos, by alleging that he was aware that a revolt was brewing and did nothing to prevent it. However this may be, the fact is that of the thousands of men in the armed forces who mutinied, and of the thousands of Greek civilians in Egypt who sympathized with the rebels, the great majority were non-communists. Whether Greek communists actually instigated the outbreaks or not, the EAM now champions the cause of the convicted mutineers, and insists that the Government proclaim a general amnesty. President Svolos of the EAM's Political Committee, who is not a communist, contends that it is both cruel and illogical to punish men for agitating for a reorganization of the Cabinet, now that the reorganization has actually taken place.

H. Russian Interest in Greece

To what degree left-wing movements may have received direct encouragement from Russia is not entirely clear. Russia has maintained diplomatic representation with the Government in exile; but in December 1943, pleading lack of adequate knowledge of Greek affairs, Molotov twice refused to make a statement on the need for Greek unity for Tsouderos to use in conjunction with those of Hull and Eden. Nevertheless, on New Year's Day the Russians did broadcast a message to Greece, urging the Greeks to unite for the final battle against the Germans, and later (between 5 and 12 January) informed the Government in exile that they supported the establishment of a union of all the guerrillas in Greece against the German invaders. Russian delay in this matter and the omission in the New Year's broadcast of mention of the United States and Britain may have been deliberately intended to create the impression that the USSR has a special stake in the solution of Greek problems.

Until the sudden arrival in Greece of a Soviet Military Mission (26 July 1944), of which the U.S. and Britain had been given no prior information, there had been no evidence of a link between Moscow and the EAM; but it is not unlikely that the Russians had been in touch with the communist leaders of the movement. It may be, as has been reported, that the EAM maintained liaison with the USSR through Bulgaria. The Soviet endorsement of Tsouderos' appeal for unity was not transmitted in a special broadcast to Greece (though it was included among the news items in the regular Cairo Greek broadcast) in order to avoid a possible over-emphasis on the Russian point of view that would strengthen the hands of communist propaganda in Greece.

That Russia possessed detailed and up-to-date information on the Greek resistance movement was demonstrated by an article by D. Vlakhov in War and the Working Class (Moscow, 15 January 1944) entitled "The National Liberation Struggle of the Greek People." Red Star for 19 March 1944 also contained a well-informed, if tendentious, article by S. Belinkov entitled "The Position of Greece." It thus became clear that Soviet intelligence services had either themselves been operating in the Greek theater or had otherwise made contact with the EAM and its representatives. Vlakhov's article is strongly pro-EAM and anti-EDES, and criticizes the Cairo government for supporting reactionary groups like Zervas' while denying assistance to EAM. Whatever the truth of the matter, the Russians are credited in some quarters with a considerable degree of control over EAM policy. "Terroristic activities" are said to have abated in November 1943, for example, because of the receipt from Moscow of instructions to cease open warfare and revert to underground methods.

More persistent are the rumors that the communist elements in the EAM are of Bulgarian rather than Russian affiliation. Some of the EAM's leading members are of Greco-Macedonian descent, with Russian training. It is stated that Bulgarian communists have helped EAM agents enter Bulgarian-occupied regions of northern Greece. Russia maintains diplomatic representatives in Sofia, and contact between the EAM and Russia has thus been feasible. Publicity was given by the Germans to the so-called Petritsi agreement of July 1943 between the communist parties of Greece and Bulgaria, in which the Greeks were said to have abdicated certain of their national interests. Greek communists were alleged on other occasions to have agreed to an independent Macedonia, thus flouting the nationalist ideals of Greece. The Germans reported a clash between nationalist and leftist students at Athens on 1 September, and declared that the leftists were beaten up. EAM leaders and a large number of others, including the Soviet newspaper Pravda for 30 January 1944, have repudiated the alleged treaty as a German forgery. On the whole it is highly improbable that the EAM should agree to concessions to Bulgaria, if only because such concessions are diametrically opposed to its avowed slogans, and would alienate large sections of Greek public opinion.

The Russian attitude towards the mutinies is not without interest. The Russian press made no secret of its dissatisfaction with the Tsouderos Government, which it described as pro-fascist. Soon after the revolt broke out, Ambassador Novikov and a number of Russian newspaper releases expressed sympathy for the mutineers and blunt criticism of the British for interfering in a purely domestic dispute. The Russian press also allegedly printed confidential items of intelligence obtained from the British.

Ambassador Leeper took these incidents to mean that the Russians were violating the agreements concluded at Teheran and Moscow. He was apparently convinced that the USSR had designs upon Greece, and he more than once declared that the appointment of Papandreou was necessary in order to safeguard Greece from the "Slavic threat." For a period of almost a month, he refused to transmit information on Greece to the Russian Embassy. Prime Minister Churchill also was troubled, and sent a formal note of protest. In his reply Molotov stated that the USSR had no interest in Greek affairs, and that the Tass Agency, which had published the despatches to which the British took exception, had been ordered to verify its sources more carefully in the future. From this exchange of notes one may conclude that the Russians, while disclaiming special interest in the Greek situation, have nonetheless served notice that they favor the EAM and the mutineers, and that they may continue to give such groups informal support from time to time.

Russian and Communist circles have been no less unfriendly to Premier Papandreou than the EAM has been. The London Daily Worker described Papandreou's appointment as a "breath-taking political bluff," and Ambassador Novikov declared that Papandreou is not the man who can solve the Greek problem. Novikov's attitude may have been influenced by Papandreou's declaration that the Russians are using the EAM to exploit the present crisis and the present wave of Anglophobia to widen the influence of the USSR in what had previously been an exclusively British sphere of influence. In this respect Papandreou seems to have been following the lead of Ambassador Leeper, who is apprehensive about the "Russian menace," and says that the time has come for the Greeks to choose whether they prefer to preserve their status as a Mediterranean power by remaining within the British orbit, or to forfeit their independence by placing their future in the hands of the USSR. Greek observers in Cairo are aware of no evidence that would support Leeper in this regard, but they are disturbed lest the British emphasis on the communist danger intensify civil strife in Greece by creating pro-Russian and pro-British parties. Such a policy, they declare, would only drive many Greeks into the arms of the USSR, and would make of Greece a "football of Anglo-Russian antagonism."

For a time Novikov refused to pay the customary diplomatic call upon Papandreou. Upon inquiry it was learned that Novikov had taken this stand because he had not been officially informed of Papandreou's appointment as premier until three weeks after the US and British Embassies had been notified. The Greek Government then learned that the delay had been caused by the negligence of three junior officials in the Foreign Office. The mistake was rectified, the guilty clerks were punished, and Novikov announced that he would make the customary visit after an interval commensurate with the delay with the delay of the Greek Government in notifying the Russian Embassy.

Conservative circles were greatly alarmed to learn that a Soviet Military Mission, consisting of three lieutenant-colonels and a number of other men of various other ranks, including, according to one report, three Jugoslav Greek-speaking guerrillas, suddenly arrived (26 July 1944) in Greece by plane. An American observer on the spot reports that the Russians, who were warmly received by the EAM and the PEEA, disclaim political aspirations in Greece and aver that they are concerned only with the collection of intelligence. Their chief, Lt. Col. Popov, announces that although he plans to remain in Greece several months, in order to make a study of the ELAS and EDES guerrillas, he expects no additions to his staff. However, although positive proof is lacking, it is probable that the Russians did intervene to effect a reconciliation between the EAM and Papandreou, and that their intervention was decisive.

In this connection, it is of some interest to note that the demands which the EAM had been making had no specifically communist character. These terms (that the ELAS guerrilla force be preserved intact, that King George give personal assurances that he would not return to Greece until after a plebiscite, that a general amnesty be proclaimed, that Papandreou resign, etc.) were intended chiefly to maintain the integrity of the organization and strengthen the hands of the left wing parties as against the royalists and Metaxists.

In conclusion, it should be emphasized that very little, if any, of the intelligence regarding the EAM and its communist leaders comes from disinterested sources. One well-placed observer goes so far as to say that in Greece the word communism has lost its meaning. The Germans, the quislings, and the other opponents of the EAM describe all Eamites as communists. Hostile propaganda has so consistently equated resistance with communism that members of Greek resistance groups are disposed to acquiesce in the designation without reference to its ideological connotation. On the other hand, Moscow-trained Communists in Greece, such as Ares Velouchiotes (Athanasios Klaras), have taken great pains to couch their appeals for support in nationalist and democratic terms. They have made little or no public use of Marxism as such. It now remains to be seen what line will be followed by the two communists who have reportedly joined the Cairo Cabinet. Their tactics will be especially revealing since they are the first communists ever to receive portfolios in a Greek Government.

IV. RUMANIA

A. The Emergence of Communism in Rumania

Before the first World War both ownership of the land and political rights in Old Rumania were concentrated in the hands of the boyars, the landed gentry, who were gradually compelled to share their power with the upper stratum of Bucharest society. Consequently the efforts of socialist as well as of other liberal groups, during the generation prior to the birth of the Third International, were absorbed by the struggle for such elementary reforms as universal suffrage and the breaking up of the large estates for distribution among the landless peasants.

The intellectual leader of the radicals of this period was the Marxist emigre from Russia, Constantin Debrogeanu-Gherea (originally Nathan Katz), who by virtue of his naturalization (following his conversion from the Jewish faith) was permitted to live in Rumania from 1875 until his death in 1920. Under his guidance radical study groups developed in Jassy, the home of the native Jewish socialists, in Bucharest, and in Ploesti; and a socialist press made its appearance. The May Day demonstrations conducted by the workers in several towns during the period 1890-96 were, however, dominated entirely by reformist rather than by revolutionary slogans. Considerable disappointment was felt in 1900 when Ion Nadejde, leader of the Social Democratic party and editor-in-chief of its daily organ, Lumea Nova, went over to the rising bourgeois party, the Liberals, taking with him several associates. In actual fact, however, most of the non-Jewish Social Democrats, who stressed the demand for universal suffrage, but were willing to see the Jews deprived of the vote, were scarcely to the left of the Liberals.

Although the government successfully checked the attempts of the socialists to spread propaganda among the oppressed peasants, unrest in the rural districts culminated in the rebellion of 1907. The bloody suppression of this uprising was accompanied by repressive measures against urban as well as rural radicals; among those exiled was the Bulgarian Marxist, Christian Rakovski, who had been active in Rumania since 1905. Nevertheless, on the eve of the Balkan and first World Wars the socialists were again active. They supported universal suffrage, agrarian reform, and separation of church and state, and took an anti-war position during the years 1912-16. In June 1915 the economic crisis led to serious labor demonstrations on the streets of Bucharest.

Although both Bessarabia and Bucovina had active communist groups in 1917-18, the creation of Greater Rumania and absorption of these areas in 1919 virtually ended their prospects of success. The year 1920, which saw the extension of the Third International to Rumania, also brought the persecution of radicals by the Averescu regime. A general strike, called on 20 October, and involving some 200,000 workers, failed. In the same year the head of the Socialist Party, Gheorghe Bujor, was sent to prison, where he remained until 1934. At a conference in 1921, the communists and Socialists split, when eight of the twelve deputies who had been elected to Parliament on the Socialist ticket voted to affiliate with the Third International. All communists taking part in the Conference were arrested. Boris Stefanov, a leading party member and one of the eight deputies arrested, was not released until 1927, when he seems to have left the country. In 1923 the Congress of Labor Unions at Cluj expelled 24,000 communists from its ranks, and was left with 29,000 members.

Discontent, probably fomented by pro-Soviet elements, was rife in Bessarabia, where the Communist Party supported the Russian claim. The Rumanian Ministry of Interior acknowledged that during the first five years of Rumanian rule in that province the police put down 150 local uprisings at a cost of 18,000 lives. During this period the government also announced that papers seized at Galatzi had revealed the existence of a propaganda center in the Transylvanian town of Targu Muresh, which was alleged to have received $16,500 of "Moscow gold" via Vienna between November 1924 and January 1925. Within the month following the issuance of this allegation, in December 1925, another clandestine headquarters was discovered at Brashov, but the details of evidence were never released.

In Rumania proper, the Communist Party propounded the thesis that the country had first to attain the liberal-bourgeois stage before a more radical change could be attempted. Hence, the party set itself the task of winning the people away from the "bourgeois" political machines by offering a progressive program. Thus, in the face of a trend to recall Prince Carol from exile in June 1926 the communist members of Parliament called for the end of the monarchy and proposed a "Workers' - Peasants' Republic." This slogan placed the communist party to the left of the National Peasants, who were approaching the zenith of their popularity as a democratic party comprising a strong majority of the electorate, without, however, favoring social revolution, or the end of the dynasty.

During the short period in which the Peasant Party was in power, 1928-30, a greater degree of political freedom prevailed, but the Communist Party scored only partial success. In May 1929 a communist convention at Timishoara, held with government permission, culminated in a street demonstration in which shots were fired by the police. Thereafter communist meetings were banned and party headquarters were guarded by troops. In the relatively free election of 1928, in which the Peasants defeated the Liberals, the communists polled only about 35,000 votes (less than 3 percent of the total). A year later the general secretary of the Socialist party attacked the regime for yielding to reactionary pressure and continuning "the quite purposeless persecution of the communists, who are of entirely negligible importance in Rumania." Among the radicals whom the Peasant government preferred to keep in prison were Bujor and the son of Dobrogeanu-Gherea.

Even in 1931, when the communists (listed as the Workers' League) doubled their 1928 total and polled 73,716 votes, they were still a relatively insignificant element in a society where an extremely conservative domestic policy and nationalistic foreign policy were the order of the day. Those discontented peasants who became unsympathetic to the two major parties, the Liberals and the Peasants, were attracted to the right-wing Iron Guard and rival fascist movements rather than to the left. The industrial laborers, who conducted a series of militant strikes in the early '30s, were effectively prevented by the government from organizing in behalf of their economic demands or their political interests. The oil workers' strike in the Ploesti district and that of the Bucharest railroad shopworkers, which occurred early in 1933, may have been led by communists, as a Party spokesman claims, but these were the last militant gestures made by Rumanian labor.

B. The Decline of the Movement

In 1933 the Communist Party was declared illegal. The vigilance of the police seems to have been highly effective ever since. Moreover, pro-Soviet propaganda among Rumanians (as distinguished from minority nationalities) has been rendered ineffective by the prevailing nationalistic attitude. Rumanians have always tended to regard the USSR as a threat to the retention of Bessarabia by Rumania.

The Communist Party has nonetheless persisted as an underground group since 1933. Two official weekly organs continued to appear at least during 1934, and special papers were published for distribution among peasants and oil workers. Among the minority nationalities, the leftist groups have included the Hungarian Workers' and Peasants' League (founded 1934) in Transylvania, the Ukrainian Vyzvoleniia in Bucovina, the Revolutionary Peasants' League in Bessarabia, and the Bulgarian Revolutionary Organization in the Dobrudja.

In 1940 there were in Bucovina and Bessarabia many persons, not necessarily advocates of a revolution, who disliked the corrupt Bucharest regime, and who welcomed the arrival of Russian forces. After the Rumanians with German help had reconquered their territories in 1941, the official gazette, over a period of more than two years, continued to publish the names of thousands of persons living in these two provinces who had been deprived of citizenship for acts hostile to the Rumanian state during the Soviet occupation. Moreover, if one may believe the Hungarian public prosecutor at Cluj, a certain degree of underground activity was also carried on in Transylvania during the '30s. At the beginning of 1943 there were on trial 662 residents (70 percent Jewish), of that province accused of being implicated in communist activities since 1919.

C. The Revival of 1943-1944

The expansion of the Communist Party's political activity coincides with the turn of the tide on the Eastern Front. In 1943, for the first time in recent years, the party began to publish a newspaper, called Romania Libera. It also attempted a rapprochement with the anti-German elements led by Maniu. Efforts to undermine the Antonescu regime were vigorously opposed by the secret police and the military authorities with repressive measures, which have received little notice in the domestic press. The failure of renewed communist agitation to strengthen the party's following to any serious extent is attributable largely to the efficiency of the Antonescu regime in locating the centers of this underground activity and to the severity of the penalties meted out.

Under the guise of a Patriotic Front the communists approached Maniu in the fall of 1943 with a proposal for collaboration on the basis of a program which soon became relatively familiar. As publicized by the Moscow press of 20 March 1944, this program consists of the following: 1. Immediate withdrawal from the alliance with Germany and support of the Allies. 2. Expulsion of the German army from Rumania. 3. Overthrow of the Antonescu government and formation of a genuinely national government. 4. Restoration of democratic rights and liberties. 5. Liberation of all political prisoners. 6. Punishment of war criminals.

Although it is readily understandable that the Patriotic Front preferred not to raise the issue of Bessarabia and Bucovina, it is somewhat surprising that the published program does not call for the recovery of northern Transylvania from Hungary. This irredentist demand was later endorsed by Moscow, and was included in the proposal for collaboration submitted to Maniu by two communist delegates. It is noteworthy that the published program of the Patriotic Front is embodied in the secret communist memorandum to Maniu, together with proposals for more drastic action, such as organized sabotage and guerrilla warfare against the Germans. According to a Hungarian informant, the Romania Libera likewise incites its readers to commit sabotage. In this respect it differs from the conservative opposition groups, which have insisted that such activities would give the Germans and their Rumanian supporters a ready excuse for reprisals.

Apart from the party's unsuccessful attempts to activate the forces led by Maniu and Bratianu and to launch a militant underground movement of a popular front type, very little light can be thrown on its official activities. What is known is derived from papers allegedly seized by the police in the course of recent raids. Thus, one informant states that the Bucharest authorities in 1943 obtained possession of the instructions of the Central Committee, recommending that groups of communists conduct meetings while pretending to hold picnics in the woods, and that propaganda groups be organized in factories, among the peasants, and among soldiers on leave. On one of the rare occasions when the Rumanian press was permitted to carry stories about communists, the regime instructed newspapers to publish the following text of an alleged circular:

"The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Rumania has been informed that the organizations in the Capital and in Ploesti have completed preparations for revolutionary activity in the field. Their cadres are fully supplied with equipment for terrorism, sabotage, street fighting and mobile propaganda machinery.

"The communist leadership is following the development of political and military events with close attention with a view to ousting the present regime in favor of a democratic government, to begin with, composed of various personalities from the former democratic political parties.

"In communist circles it is said that contact has been established with some of the former democratic political personalities, with whom a plan of action toward this end has been initiated."

It would, no doubt, be a mistake to accept the alleged circular at face value. The intimation that the communists are an armed band of terrorists is probably false, and intended to frighten the public. It has not been confirmed by actual events. On the other hand, that part of the circular which indicates a desire for a united front with the non-communist opposition appears accurately to represent the party's views. Of course, this does not preclude the possibility that the circular is a fabrication designed to incriminate men like Maniu and Bratianu. It is, nevertheless, significant that the authorities responsible for law and order realized that pro-Soviet plotters aimed to stage a coup d'état, rather than a social revolution after the model of the Russian Revolution of October 1917.

Maniu has not joined the communists in a united front. When approached late in 1943, he rejected their proposed collaboration on the ground that they were evading the question of the Soviet claim to Bessarabia and northern Bucovina. Thereafter Romania Libera attacked Maniu for refusing to work with the Patriotic Front; and no further progress is known to have been made in the intervening months. Nevertheless, Maniu has on occasion intervened effectively on behalf of communists in danger. During 1943 he provided counsel for several men on trial for their lives at Constantza, and wrote a letter to the court, resulting in a less severe penalty for the accused. According to the Frankfurter Zeitung, one of Maniu's prominent associates, Mihai Ralea (arrested toward the end of 1942) had also been known to provide legal aid for men accused of communist activities. It is noteworthy that a Rumanian emigré, G. Marole, in a lecture delivered at Moscow 19 April 1944, while claiming that the Patriotic Front was growing and that overt opposition to the regime was making itself felt, admitted that the movement had not yet rallied all the anti-fascist forces under its banner.

It is plausibly reported that the communists have been endeavoring to indoctrinate soldiers returning from service on Soviet territory. There is, nevertheless, no reason to believe that any large number of these men has become pro-Soviet as a result of their experiences. Only a small minority is reported to have been favorably impressed by the collectives and by the relatively high standard of living of the peasantry in the Ukraine.. Widespread surprise and satisfaction , however, is reported to have been expressed by some of these Rumanian soldiers over the fact that the churches had not been proscribed by the Soviet regime. One unconfirmed report states that the Soviets in 1943 released several thousand Rumanian prisoners of war without asking for any of their own men in exchange, thus raising the possibility that the released Rumanians had been indoctrinated and were expected to serve as spreaders of propaganda at home.

The present position of the Communist Party as a political force may be judged to some extent by the action taken by the Bucharest police, who periodically raid quarters used by alleged communists. In general, official reports intentionally give the impression that all persons unsympathetic to the Antonescu policy of collaboration with Germany are radicals. The reports also usually stress the presence of Jews among the persons arrested, without troubling to note that the mere possession of a radio receiving set, a standard item in such stories, is illegal only for Jews. The anti-Semitic motif is further stressed in the recurrent references to the wealth possessed by the accused Jews. A sampling of the more sensational reports of repressive measures against "Communists" will serve to supplement the information presented above. On 9 December 1943, the following release was published in the Bucharest press; "Agents of the capital's police prefecture have uncovered an organization of 66 communists, who have been operating within the limits of the capital as well as in certain provincial centers. Together with others this organization has been meeting in nine conspiratorial houses, some of which were equipped with radio sets which enabled them to intercept broadcasts issued by our enemies, which they then spread for the purpose of defeatist propaganda. Among those arrested 65% are Jews, including some very well situated materially. All other versions circulating in Bucharest are in the realm of fantasy."

A fortnight after the foregoing release appeared, there occured the arrest of a group headed by a Jewish lawyer named

1.

Wechsler. It is alleged that the police entered Wechsler's sumptuous villa in Bucharest a few days before Christmas and found the radical plotters holding a meeting. On the premises the police are supposed to have found a printing press and copies of communist manifestoes in a variety of languages, as well as large sums in foreign currency. Among the "many imported documents" was a list of members of a proposed cabinet to replace the Antonescu regime. Nevertheless, the only specific counts against Wechsler referred to foreign currency transactions and aiding illegal entrants into the country. At the beginning of March 1944 it was reported that Wechsler and his wife had received sentences of twenty-five years, while their accomplices, Prof. Vladescu-Racoasa, and two brothers, said to be sons of an important judge named Maghieru, were sentenced from ten to fifteen years' imprisonment.

During the first month of 1944 the army as well as the police found it necessary to deal with militant communists. An armed "partisan" band was reported to be operating in the marshes of the Danube delta. Under the leadership of an aristocratic Rumanian beauty, wrote the Budapest correspondent of a Stockholm paper, 100 partisans, well supplied with weapons, a radio transmitter and a sum of 20-30 million lei (over $100,000), held out for four days against an army detachment. The soldiers are said to have killed 40 of the alleged communists and captured the remaining 60. Another Budapest correspondent, in a despatch of the same date, named a Prof. Constantinescu of the Jassy Faculty of Theology (now reported to be in Moscow) as the leader of the Rumanian communists.

During the same month the Bucharest police had to shoot their way into a house suspected of serving as communist headquarters. According to one report, a radio transmitter and a printing plant were discovered on the premises. The leader of the group using these headquarters was Sasha Pinkelsohn, described as a former Jewish lawyer from Cernautzi, who had returned from Russia in 1942 as a Soviet agent.

Since last January there has been only one report similar to those cited above, but the political significance of this item is highly questionable. On 24 March the Berlin radio announced that the Bucharest police had caught "a large communist organization formed by Jews", consisting of thirty-two men, of whom seven had come from Poland. Although the indictment is said to contain a charge of organizing Jewish-Communist propaganda groups, the only concrete accusations have to do with smuggling Jews across the Polish-Rumanian border and the illegal transfer of Jewish-owned property from Rumania to other countries.

Inasmuch as the agrarian reform of the '20s has not succeeded in raising the peasants' standard of living, proposals in favor of additional reforms have often been propounded and these are occassionally ascribed to persons of communist leanings. During recent months there has been some discussion of a reform suggested by ex-Premier Tatarescu which would parcel out individually owned estates exceeding 100 ha. (about 250 acres). This proposal by a conservative politician has been endorsed by Graur of the Peasant party, who is said to have written Maniu a letter on the subject. This liberal tendency among politically-minded Rumanians who are at the same time definitely anti-Soviet, has given rise to the charge that the anti-German forces are tending toward communist views on private property. This idea has been widely reported and has been made the subject of a recent editorial in a German newspaper published at Timishoara. This editorial states in part: "there are forces among his (Maniu's) followers which are organizing the building of a bridge to the communist revolutionary movement, and one cannot acquit Maniu of responsibility."

During the interval between the two World Wars a number of Rumanian communists found refuge in the Soviet Union. One of these refugees, Anna Pauker, was convicted together with Bujor in 1920, but served a shorter prison term. She was rumored in the fall of 1943 to be slated for leadership of a Free Rumania Committee to be formed in Moscow. This rumor linked Anna Pauker with Prince Scarlot Callimachi, who is said until a few years ago to have been a "playboy" member of the wealthy class of Bucharest, and who was regarded as a parlor pink. No Free Rumania Committee has yet been formed in Moscow, however, and during the spring of 1944 the Soviet authorities apparently preferred to call on other refugees, such as G. Manole and ex-deputy Constantin Matza, to broadcast to Rumania and to encourage the Patriotic Front to continue its work.

After the Russian army's advance to the Prut River in the spring of 1944, a new field of activity seems to have been opened to pro-Soviet elements among the Rumanians. The occupied zone of Moldavia, which is presumably to be restored to Rumania after the war is alleged by the Rumanian authorities to be administered by Rumanian communists serving as mayors, prefects, and police chiefs. According to another equally improbable report, Rumanian prisoners of war and other pro-Soviet persons from Bessarabia and Bucovina are being organized as an army which will eventually be sent to Jassy, the Moldavian capital, when the Soviet advance reaches that point. The man chosen to head the government to be installed at Jassy is said to be a member of Rumania's Ukranian minority named Brovco, last reported to be in Stefaneshti, a town on the upper Prut. An eyewitness account by Henry Cassidy, an American newspaper correspondent, reports on the contrary, that, in keeping with Molotov's promise that no changes would be made in Rumania's social structure, the Russian authorities have left the Rumanian local administration intact.

V. ALBANIA

A. Origin of the Communist Movement

Communism has never played an appreciable role in Albania. A basically conservative social and political structure has prevented any widespread growth of radical or liberal ideologies, and Russia has made no noticeable attempt to penetrate the country. Albania is a primitive agricultural country with no industries or proletariat, and with a high rate of illiteracy. Moreover, Communist doctrine is not readily adjusted to the tenets of Islam, the religion of 70 percent of the Albanian population. Local ties, particularly in the north, where tribal authority is still strong, tend to be more important to the Albanian than national, let alone international, considerations. In the south, a feudal system of land tenure provides a subject capable of Communist exploitation, but a strong feeling of individualism would almost certainly prohibit so radical a change as collectivism in any extreme form.

The so-called Communist Party of Albania was not formed until after the German attack on Russia in the summer of 1941. Political parties in any ordinary sense had not existed under Zog's autocratic regime. The King was not at all disposed to tolerate those isolated Albanians who returned from abroad inspired by leftist doctrine. Mustafa Gjinishi and Dr. Sejfulla Malleshova, both well-educated and widely-travelled intellectuals, were imprisoned and then exiled. Malleshova was at one time secretary to Bishop Fan Noli, the liberal premier who was ousted by Zog in 1924, and who has since become an American citizen. Two other early communists, more doctrinaire than Gjinishi or Malleshova, were Mehmet Shehu and Bedri Spahiu, both of whom served with the loyalists in Spain. Of no previous political importance, these men and presumably a few others, have returned to Albania and have probably been instrumental in organizing the party. Gjinishi, at least, is reported to have been present at the initial meeting, allegedly held at Scutari in the summer of 1941. Also reported present were Miladin and "Dushan," or "Ali," two Yugoslavs representing the Comintern. While the exact responsibility for the formation of the party is not definitely known, it clearly owes its growth and its present influence to the need for organized resistance. Communist-led bands began to harrass the Axis forces in late 1941 and early 1942.

B. The National Liberation Movement (LNC)

Gradually improving their own organization, the Communists are believed to have taken the initiative in attempting to coordinate the activity of Albanian guerrilla groups. A conference was held at Peza, in September 1942, attended by the communists and "nationalist" leaders who had formed their own local bands, and by other Albanian patriots. Setting aside political, regional, and religious differences, the participants succeeded in laying the groundwork for a general organization to be called the Levizje Nacional Clirimtare (National Liberation Movement), abbreviated as LNC. At this and at subsequent conferences, organizational plans and a definite program were gradually developed, until by the summer of 1943 the LNC had become an effective resistance organization. Its leaders, apparently chosen on the basis of their previous records, originally included three "nationalists": Abas Kupi, leading supporter of Zog, who had won national acclaim by his initial opposition to the Italians at the time of their invasion, in April 1939; Myslim Peza, a well-known and able peasant who had conducted daring exploits in the Tirana area; and Baba Faya Marteneshi, a fairly wealthy Bektashi[1] abbot, widely known and held in unusually high esteem. The remaining leaders of the Central Council, or governing body of the LNC, were members of the Communist party, the most important being Mustafa Gjinishi and Sejfulla Malleshova, the left-wing intellectuals mentioned above, Professor Enver Hoxha and Dr. Ymer Dishnica, also described as left-wing intellectuals, both of whom speak good French, and Haxhi Lleshi, a leading guerrilla.

Although it was originally intended to include all factions, the LNC gradually became more exclusively leftist. At the time of the Peza conference or soon thereafter, the more conservative elements of the LNC began to form their own organization, in order to counteract the left-wing already organized as the communist party. The members of this group, called the Balli Kombetar (National Front) or BK, were mainly propertied men, who feared communist domination, and whose opposition to what they considered to be unnecessary sacrifice of Albanian lives gradually led them toward collaboration. By July 1943, the basic difference in outlook had become apparent. The chief LNC leaders, meeting at Labinot, issued a declaration condemning the uncooperative attitude of the BK, and clearly stating the platform of the LNC. The LNC, they declared, welcomes all those who sincerely wish to oppose the invader, irrespective of religion, district, or party. It fights for an "independent, democratic, and popular Albania." It is not Marxist, in that it respects private property and initiative, and favors no radical changes. After the war, the people will be free to choose their own form of government.

---

[1] Bektashism is a liberal Moslem cult, which ignores the external practices required by the Koran. Because of their tolerance, the Bektashi who form about 20 percent of the Albanian population, have been a unifying factor in the national life.

However, despite pleas for unity on both sides, the breach between the LNC and the B^K widened until the two had become separate and hostile organizations. In the summer of 1943, the chieftains of the Dibra area in northern Albania formed another movement of the right, called the Dibra league. Finally, in November 1943, Abas Kupi, the royalist member of the LNC Central Council, formed the Zogist, or Legality Party, broke away from the LNC, and began to amass as much "nationalist" or conservative support as possible. These right-wing nationalist groups oppose the LNC, have refrained from action against the Germans, and in many cases have collaborated with the Germans.

By January 1944, the LNC, thus stripped of conservative leadership, abandoned and opposed by its former Allies, was clearly dominated by the Communist Party. Myslim Peza, the peasant leader, and Baba Faya, the Bektashi Abbot, were among the few non-party members still prominent in the movement. Both are intelligent, influential, and able military men, but are said to have taken little initiative in political or administrative matters. Even if they had, it would probably not have affected the LNC's orientation, since, in opposing the landowning Beys and espousing social justice, they have taken a stand similar to that of their communist associates. Despite undisputed communist leadership, however, a careful distinction has been maintained between the movement as a whole and the party itself, which has a distinct organization within the general framework of the LNC. Occasional pamphlets under the title Zeri I Popullit (The Voice of the

People) containing much pro-Russian sentiment, have been issued by the party rather than by the LNC, which has its own organ called Bashkimi (Union). In answering the anti-communist polemics of the right-wing, it has usually been the communist party, rather than the LNC which is defended.

The LNC's consistently active policy is responsible for a large part of its following. Under both the Italian and the German occupation, it has been the only organization which offers the Albanian a chance to fight the invader. Consequently, a large number of its adherents are drawn from among Albanian youths, some of them relatives of propertied leaders in the Nationalist movement or the German-sponsored regime. Lef Nosi, one of the puppet Regents, has, for instance, a nephew in the LNC. It is probable that very few of these young men have even heard of Karl Marx; those who have are ill-suited by education or temperament to accept even modified communism. They call themselves communist because the term has become roughly synonymous with resistance. Most of them are townsmen or peasants from the southern part of Albania, where the population is slightly better educated and has had more outside connections than the north. Strong loyalty to the tribal chieftains, who for the most part are connected with the nationalist elements, and deep-seated fear of the Serbs have, on the whole, prevented the LNC, with its foreign connections, from making much significant headway among the northern mountaineers.

In organization and general temper, the LNC resembles Tito's partisans and the Greek EAM. Its members use the clenched fist salute, wear a badge bearing the Red Star and the Albanian eagle, and use the salutation "Death to fascism" to which the reply is "Liberty to the people." It is organized in military units and regional councils (roughly corresponding to the prefectures), each with its commandant, and political commissar. There are also secret councils in the occupied areas, whose chief duties have been to promote underground resistance activity and to prepare for future administrative responsibilities. In the areas under its control, the LNC provides administration through village and town councils, often drawn from the richest and most influential members of the local population. These councils, under the influence of the commissars, organize simple public services and maintain order. Discipline is strict throughout the LNC, and the political commissars appear to make the important decisions in both the military units and the councils. Mostly young and often the sons of rich men, they are party members, but, like the rank and file of LNC members, are apparently more concerned with freeing Albania than with social revolution.

Until May 1944, the movement was nominally headed by the Presidium of the Central Council, consisting of the original leaders, with the exception of Abas Kupi, and a few others. Its members and the members of the Council at large assembled only to decide matters of general policy, since they had additional regular duties. The controlling body which functioned all the time was the Executive Council, divided into a military, a political, and a propaganda section, the membership of which was largely drawn from the Central Committee.

The military section of the Executive Council functioned as the general staff of the LNC, being responsible for the organization and administration of the brigades and "cetas" (bands). Its commandant or Chief of Staff, was Major Spiro Moisiu, who, with Enver Hoxha, the political commissar of the General Staff, did a major part of the Council's work. Hoxha, who is now the formal leader of the LNC, has apparently always been outstanding in the movement and the Communist Party. A third member of the General Staff was "Ali" or "Dushan," the Yugoslav who was supposedly influential in the formation of the Albanian communist party, and who is said to be Tito's representative.

Included in the political section of the Executive Council were Mustapha Gjinishi and Ymer Dishnica. Gjinishi is considered a man equal in stature to Enver Hoxha. Even in his pre-war Communist days he is said to have advocated nothing more radical than agrarian reform, although he is also reported to have been in the pay of Russia. The only known member of the propaganda section was Sejfulla Malleshova, Bishop Fan Noli's former secretary, now known as Lame Kodra, the red poet.

C. The "Provisional Government" of the LNC

Until recently, the program of the LNC was based on the principles set forth at the Congress of Labinot. It professed to be non-political; a desire to fight the invader was its one condition of membership; it denied any intention of introducing radical change; and, ignoring the question of Zog, it asserted that the Albanians would be free to choose their own government after the war. In May 1944, however, it undertook a reorganization and embarked on a more definite political program. Assembling at Permet in southern Albania, 250 delegates including representatives of the secret councils in north and central Albania elected a "Grand Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation," endowed with legislative and executive powers until a plebiscite could be held. The Council then chose an "Anti-Fascist Committee of National Liberation" intended to serve as a "Provisional Government" or cabinet.

The chief factors leading to the establishment of the "Provisional government" were apparently an unusually strong military position, the precedents established by Tito and the EAM, and the activities of the Albanian nationalists. The German-sponsored Government, the Zogists, the leaders of the northern Dibra league and various elements of the BK had been showing signs of uniting in opposition to the LNC. Loosely affiliated in a group called by the British the "Tirana Groups," they were trying to amass as much support as possible, with the apparent intention of seizing control of the puppet government, of destroying LNC influence, and of maintaining themselves in power by negotiating with the Allies for the return of Zog. Abas Kupi, the Zogist leader, had been particularly active in this regard. While avoiding open collaboration with the Germans, he had refrained from action against them after his break with the LNC, and had engaged in political negotiations with anyone who could increase the strength of the royalist movement. His efforts and a general fear of communism had apparently been responsible for a notable increase in royalist support among the nationalists, even among groups who had formerly been strongly opposed to the King.

Although the LNC had previously been officially silent on the subject of Zog, partly out of reluctance to alienate royalist sympathizers, there had never been much doubt of the movement's anti-royalist stand. Individual members were outspoken, and the movement as a whole disliked Zog's autocratic record. With the increase in royalist support among the nationalists, the LNC found it expedient to voice its sentiments, and rally support around an anti-Zogist program. The advance notices announced that the new government would suppress reactionary attempts to return Zog by vote; and the speeches delivered at the Congress contained strong indictments of both King Zog and the royalist leader, Abas Kupi. Full responsibility for the Italian invasion was placed on the Zogist regime. Kupi was branded a traitor and collaborationist.

The formation of the new government also gave the LNC an opportunity to demonstrate its administrative ability and political behavior. The delegates to the Congress were elected, so that, as far as possible under existing conditions, they might be representative. Local councils in LNC-held territory elected representatives who in turn elected the delegates to the Congress. The franchise was given to both men and women over seventeen years of age. The only restriction on the voter's choice was that the candidate be neither a collaborator nor a fascist. In occupied areas, where voting was impossible, the LNC councils chose the delegates, and in the army, each brigade provided three representatives. Although the LNC councils were given control over the elections and although the LNC's idea of a "collaborator" seems often to be synonymous with "political opponent," the LNC "government" nonetheless represents a considerable advance in the utilization of democratic techniques over any administration Albania has hitherto known.

Except that it is now openly political, the LNC "government" does not represent an appreciable change from the previous organizations. Most of the leadership is drawn from the former LNC council, and the communist party is still clearly in control. Enver Hoxha, former political commissar, and one of the earlier communist leaders, is now both President of the Anti-Fascist Council or cabinet, and commander-in-chief of the LNC forces. Out of a total of eleven Cabinet Ministers, at least five are party members. They include Sejfulla Malleshovo, the red poet; Ymer Dishnica, formerly of the political sections of the executive council; Haxhi Lleshi, the early Communist guerilla; and Bedri Spahiu, veteran of the Spanish civil war. The party, as such, has not been emphasized, however. In fact, care has been taken to include prominent non-communists. The president of the "Anti-Fascist Council" is Ymer Nishani, an old man who has had a moderating influence on the LNC Central Council, but who is otherwise a figurehead. The Vice-President of the "Council" is Baba Faya, the Bektashi Abbot; and the vice-president of the cabinet is Myslim Peza, noted peasant leader. As before, most of these men also hold important military posts.

D. Foreign Connections of the LNC

So far as is known, the LNC has no direct connections with Russia. It maintains fairly close relations, however, with similar movements in neighboring countries, particularly with the Yugoslav Partisans. In some instances it may actually take orders indirectly from Tito. A close liaison is said to exist with the Partisan leader in Macedonia "Tempo," (General Vukmanovich) who has also visited the Greek EAM, and with other Partisan liaison officers who may visit the LNC as often as once a week. Moreover, "Ali," alias "Dushan," and "Miladin," reputed representatives of the Yugoslav Communist Party and possibly the original organizers, have held executive positions in the LNC. "Ali" is apparently an energetic and fiery individual, well-versed in underground organization, with a general mistrust of the British and a strong influence over the LNC leaders. As his name implies, he is probably a Moslem, and thus from Tito's point of view a natural choice for work in

Albania. The LNC also maintains connections with the EAM, and with the Macedonian General Staff. Personal contact with foreign groups is naturally closest in the frontier regions, where Albanian and Yugoslav or Albanian and Macedonian guerrillas occassionally work together. For instance, the Kossovo-Metohiya General Staff, operating in the Kossovo region and believed to be under Tito's orders, is headed by an Albanian named Fadil Hoxha and includes Albanian, Yugoslav, and Macedonian representatives.

Since it is cooperating with Tito's partisans and the Greek EAM, the LNC's official attitude toward Albania's neighbors is naturally friendly. This friendship appears, however, to be a superficial one, based more on the need for common action than on any lasting bond. The LNC's true feelings are said to be easily discoverable in conversation with individual members. In the long run, the LNC's attitude is not basically different from that of the nationalists, all of whom fear Serb and Greek aggression, and whose concern over the future of Kossovo (claimed by the Serbs) and southern Albania or northern Epirus (claimed by the Greeks) overshadows other considerations. While the LNC officially believes that territorial questions belong to the post-war period, its current friendship with the Greeks and the Yugoslavs, had not made its members adverse to an "ethnic" Albania.

Expressing its belief in the alliance between Russia, Great Britain, and the U.S., the LNC has always maintained a friendly attitude toward the Allies. It does, however, lean more toward Russia than to the Western Allies, although the extent of actual Russian influence is probably not very great. Since Russia did not figure in Albanian national life before the war, much of the pro-Russian sentiment which has arisen must be attributed to admiration for Russian victories. The LNC is also sympathetic to Britain and the United States, but harbors reservations about their foreign policies and intentions in the Balkans. LNC leaders are said to have referred cryptically to reactionary tendencies in high places, and British Balkan policy appears to be almost universally unpopular among Albanians, though not often specifically condemned. British-American support of the governments in exile has caused particular suspicion, arising out of the widespread belief that the exiled governments are unrepresentative and are supported by the Allies for reasons of self-interest. In general, the US is considered more disinterested and more democratic than Britain, having earned a good reputation through the large Albanian-American emigrant population, and through the good record of American schools in Albania.

Allied reluctance to adopt a specific policy with regard to the complex Albanian situation has caused a certain resentment in the LNC. It has been encouraged by the various Allied declarations on the subject, but apparently feels that these have been too few in number and too general in tone. It also feels that its efforts have been slighted by Allied broadcasts, which until recently carefully refrained from mentioning any group by name and thus did not specifically differentiate between collaborationists and active resistance groups. Since May 1944, however, the LNC has considered itself somewhat better treated by the Allies. It has received more military support and the Allies have adopted a sterner attitude toward collaborationist groups. General Wilson's warning to these groups was apparently particularly well received. Current negotiations between LNC representatives and the Allies in Italy appear likely further to improve

LNC-Allied relations.

E. The LNC and Its Opponents

Insistence on subservience to the will of its leaders has probably won the LNC its greatest criticism from its opponents, from some of its supporters, and from certain Allied observers, since these leaders are young and relatively unknown. This fact has been largely responsible for what appears to be a real fear on the part of the conservatives, a fear which has, of course, been fully exploited by the Germans. As in Greece and Yugoslavia the whole resistance movement has been labelled communist. The members of the German-sponsored government, Bashkimi I Kombit, the official Tirana newspaper, the BK, and the Zogists have devoted a great deal of their energy to dissertations on the "communist terror." They accuse the communists of seeking to destroy the true nationalists in order to make Albania the tool of Tito and the Russians. They point out that the true enemies of the communists are not the Germans, but "nationalism, social patriotism, and social democracy." Such men as Father Anton Harapi, formerly the Roman Catholic member of the Regency council in the German-sponsored government, have however, admitted that there are "few who call themselves communists who know what they are doing." The real anti-communist attacks have been directed at the leaders of the LNC, with particular emphasis on their foreign connections, their disregard for "ethnic Albania," and the fact that they have lead the Albanian youth astray in a movement which is "un-Albanian."

The LNC's almost fanatical desire to fight the invader has resulted in an uncompromising attitude towards its political opponents. It does not hesitate to execute its political opponents as enemy agents, and it bears a large responsibility for fomenting the civil strife which began shortly after the Italian capitulation in September 1943. Thinking that an Allied invasion was imminent, both the LNC and the BK began to strive for domination. Then, when the invasion failed to materialize, the BK's cautious attitude and antipathy to the LNC drew it into increased military inactivity, and even collaboration while the LNC adopted the view that BK members were traitors, and issued orders to fight them.

More recently, it has also been partially responsible for a tense situation with the Zogist leader, Abas Kupi. Having considerably increased its military strength in southern Albania, the LNC started moving northward into nationalist and German-held territory ostensibly for the purpose of disrupting German communications. Actually, it appears to have had the additional purpose of coming to grips with Abas Kupi. Under pressure from the Allies, LNC leaders have expressed themselves willing to negotiate, but have not apparently altered their deep-seated antipathy to Abas Kupi's movement. Their attitude may be partially responsible for what, at present, appears to be the failure of Allied attempts to draw Kupi into action against the Germans.

The outcome of the mutually bitter LNC-nationalist rivalry will undoubtedly play a large part in determining the extent of LNC's "communist" influence in post-war Albania. At any rate, it would appear that the LNC will make a strenuous effort to oppose attempts to return King Zog. It is likely to favor some form of government which would oppose the vested interests of the southern landowners or Beys, sponsor agrarian reform, and try to lead Albania into articipation in a Balkan federation.